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Constituting a disruptive technol ogy, Artif icial Intelligence (‘AI’) is impacting all 
industries.  However,  there are rising concerns that the patent system may not be f it  
for the future of innovation that is increasingly AI -related and intangible. Indeed, 
the execution of  AI -related inventions requires some kind of  computer 
implementation, thereby potentially reviving patentabil ity issues related to  
computer-implemented inventions.  Whilst  patent off ices around the world have 
found ways to adapt their patent system s to grant protection to software, dif ficult ies 
remain in relation to algorithm-based inventions though  they form a signif icant 
part of  today’s innovation. Currently, algorithms themselves do not quali fy as 
patentable inventions.  Even if  algorithms overcome  this first  hurdle,  concerns arise 
in relation to the application of patentabili ty requirements such as novelty where 
national dif ferences remain. This research evaluates the adequacy of  the novelty 
requirement in relation to AI -inventions where many of  the underlying concepts and 
technologies are not novel.  The ultimate aim is to evaluate the adequacy of  the 
patent system by looking at  inventions that uti l ize AI , with a particular focus on 
the excluded subject matters and the novelty requirement. To this e nd, the research 
adopts a comparative analysis of  these concepts in Europe (EPC countries),  Japan 
and the United States.  
  
2 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Table of  Contents  
I.   Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5  
II .  Purpose of the patent  system  .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7  
III .  Definition of  AI for the purpose of  IoT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  
IV.  Rationale for protect ing AI algorithms under patent  law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  
1.  Arguments  supporting the protection o f  AI  algorithms under patent law.  . .  19  
2.  Arguments  opposing the extension of  patent  law to algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24  
3.  Interim Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  
V.  The first  hurdle: subject -matter eligibil ity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28  
1.  Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30  
2.  Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34  
3.  US .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  
4.  Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42  
VI.  The second hurdle:  challenges in applying the novelty requirement  . . . . . . . .  47  
1.  Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48  
2.  Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50  
3.  US .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52  
4.  Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54  
VII.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Conclusion and recommendations  57  
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63  
 
 
 
4 
 
  
5 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The patentabil ity of artificial  intelligence (AI) revives the broader debate around 
the patentabil ity of computer programs which are now recognized as patent-eligible 
inventions across Europe, the United States of America (‘US’) ,  and Japan after a 
dense history of legal developments .1  With the promise of the Internet of Things 
(‘IoT’) - characterized by the interoperabil ity of parts of a smart device or between 
smart  devices using the Internet and embedded in everyday objects –  i t  is  crucial 
to clarify what patent protection is available for AI algorithms and programs.2   
The current patent systems have mostly focused on protecting the physical  
structures and the configuration of physical  systems. As the future of innovation is 
increasingly intangible, one of the main problems  concerns the economics of 
algorithmic innovation. Consti tuting a giant network of connected devices, objects 
and people through the interplay of sensors ,  IoT relies on powerful and complex 
algorithms to collect  and analyze data from different devices ,  and to then share the 
resulting information with applications built  to address specif ic needs  in real time.3  
All IoT projects will include an AI component. 4  Indeed, if IoT devices and 
 
1  So me a rgu e  th at  th e  con fus ion  i s  l i nk ed  to  th e  f ac t  th a t  ea r ly  d eb ates  sup po sed ly  fo cu s ing  on  wh e th er  
so f tware  sh ould  b e  p a t en tab le ,  ac tu a l ly  r e l a t ed  to  th e  p rel imin ary  qu es t ion  o f  d e f in ing  so f tware .  B .  
Sh erman,  ‘ In t angib l e  Machin es :  Pat en t  P ro t ect io n  fo r  So ftware  in  th e  Uni t ed  S ta t es’  (201 9)  57 (1 )  His to ry  
o f  S ci en ce ,  18 -37 .  
2  A l so  suppo r t ed  b y  WIPO Techn olo gy  Trend s  2 0 19 ,  Art i f i c ia l  In t e l l ig en ce  (20 19 ) ,  143  av ai l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / /www.wip o . in t / ed o cs /pub do cs/ en /wipo _pub _1 055.pd f ;  Co mmi t t ee  t o  Review In t e l l ec tu al  P rop er ty  
r eg ard ing  New Data - r e l a t e d  Asset s ,  In t e l l ec tu a l  Prop er ty  S t r a t egy  Headqu ar t e r s ’  Ver i f i ca t io n ,  Ev alu a t ion  
an d  Plan ning  Co mmi t t ee ,  Repo r t  -Towa rd  Bu i ld in g  the  In t e l l ectua l  P rop ert y  S ys t em,  th e  Foun dat ion  fo r  
S t reng th en in g  Indu s t r ia l  Co mp et i t i ven ess ,  b y  Pro mot ing  th e  Use  o f  Da ta  and  Art i f i c ia l  In t e l l ig en ce (AI ) -
,  (March  20 17)  ( ‘Da ta -Rela t ed  Asse t s  Rep or t ’ ) ,  40 .  
3  Co mmi t t ee  to  Di scu ss  a  Nex t -g en erat io n  In t e l l ec tua l  P rop er ty  Sy s t em,  Ver i f i ca t io n ,  Ev alu at ion  an d  
Plan nin g  Co mmi t t ee ,  In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty  S t r a t egy  Head qu ar t e r s ,  Repo r t  o f  t he  Co mmit t ee  t o  Di scu ss  a  
Next -g en era t io n  In t e l l ectu a l  Prop er t y  S ys t em —Towa rd  th e  Co n st ru c t ion  o f  a  Nex t -g en era t ion  In t e l l ectua l  
Prop er t y  S ys t em A da pted  to  t h e  Ri se  o f  Dig i ta l  Ne tworks ,  (Ap r i l  201 6) ,  4 .  
4  And  wh i l s t  t h i s  d i scu ss io n  i s  a t t r act ing  more  and  more  acad emic  a t t en t ion  in  Jap an ,  au tho r i t i e s  t end  to  
fo cu s  on  th e  impl i ca t io n  o f  AI  fo r  c rea t iv e  en d eavo rs  r a th e r  th an  th e  e f f ec t  fo r  th e  p at en t  s y s t em.  Da ta -
Rela t ed  Asset s  Repo r t ,  su pra  n .  2 ;  Secret a r i a t  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  P rop er ty  S t r a t eg y  Headq u ar t e r s ,  Trea tmen t  
o f  wo rks  crea ted  b y  AI  ( fo r  d i scu ss ion ) ) ,  ( Janu ary  20 16 ) ;  Co mmit t ee  to  Discu ss  a  Nex t -g en erat io n  
In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty  Sy s t em,  Ver i f i cat io n ,  Ev a lu a t ion  and  P lann ing  Co mmit t ee ,  In t e l l ectu a l  P rop er ty  
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components generate vast  amount s of data, the analysis element can be substantially 
enhanced through AI. Where tradit ional data analysis techniques were not designed 
with the vast  amount of real -t ime data in mind, AI can mitigate this problem through 
the interplay of machine learning  algorithms. By simulating human behavior, AI 
creates  actionable insights based on identified patterns from the connected devices  
without , in some cases,  the need for any human intervention . Additionally,  AI can 
help solve some of the interoperabili ty issues between devices where operational 
technology systems have not  been designed to allow devices to communicate with 
each other,  or through the interplay of a central  platform.  
IoT providers are increasingly updating their equipment to accommodate the use of 
AI, 5  rendering the debate on the proper level of protection for algorithmic 
inventions unavoidable. 6  Currently,  algorithms are excluded from the scope of  
patent protection because these are not considered to be ‘inventions’ for being too 
abstract  of non-technical .7  Proponents for broadening the patent system to cover 
algorithms within its scope tend to a rgue that  al lowing algorithms to be patented 
would encourage innovation in the AI industry,  enable the reali zation of the 
promises of the IoT, contribute to consumer welfare,  and benefit society as a whole 
through the increase of trade and economic wealth.  Opponents,  on the other hand, 
argue that  patenting algorithm s would lead to the grant ing of monopolies over 
abstract  ideas,  stifle innovation , and lead to the exclusion of some players , which 
 
St rat egy  Headq u ar t e r s ,  Towa rd  th e  Con s t ru c t ion  o f  a  Next -g en era t ion  In t e l l ec tua l  Prop ert y  S ys t em 
Adap ted  to  th e  R i se  o f  Dig i ta l  Netwo rks ,  (Ap r i l  20 1 6) ,  4 -7 ;  S imi l a r ly ,  i n  Eu ro pe ,  E .  Frase r ,  ‘Co mp ut er s  
as  inv ento r s  –  l eg al  and  po l i cy  imp l i ca t ion s  of  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l ig en ce on  pa t en t  l aw’  (2016 )  1 3(3 )  
SCRIPTed ,  307 .  
5  E.g .  Micro so f t ’ s  l au n ch  o f  Azu re  IoT  Edg e and  Amazo n’s  Greeng rass .   
6  USPTO,  ‘Requ est  fo r  Co mment s  on  In t e l l ec tu a l  P rop er ty  P ro t ect ion  fo r  Ar t i f i c i a l  In t e l l ig en ce  
Inno v at ion ’  (Oc to b er  3 0 ,  2019 )  84 (210 )  Fed era l  Regi s t er  5 8141 -58 142  [Do ck e t  No .  PTO – C–20 19–0 038 ;  
Sub miss io n  by  Swi t ze r l an d  to  t h e  EPO on  th e  l eg al  a sp ec t s  o f  p at en t ing  inv ent ion s  invo lv ing  a r t i f i c i a l  
in t e l l i g en ce  (AI )  as  su mm ari zed  by  Hel i  P ih l a j amaa  b efo re  th e  Co mmi t t ee  on  Pa ten t  Law on  Febru ary  
20 t h ,  2 019  an d  av a i l ab l e  a t  
h t tp : / / do cu ment s . epo .o rg /pro j ec ts /b abylon /epon e t . n s f /0 /3 918 F57 B01 0 A354 0C12584 1900 2806 53/$F i l e /A
I_ inv en to r sh ip_ su mmary_ of_ answers_ en .p df   
7  Th e  US  memb ers  o f  cong ress  con s id er  a  d ra f t  b i l l  to  e l imin a te  th e  jud ic i a l ly  c reat ed  ex clu sio n s  f ro m  
pa ten t - e l ig ib i l i ty ;  see  Ch r i s  Coon s ,  Sen s .  Coon s  an d  Ti l l i s  and  Rep s .  Col l i ns ,  John son ,  and  S t iv e r s  r e l ease  
dra f t  b i l l  t ex t  to  r efo rm Sec t io n  1 01  o f  th e  Pa t en t  Ac t  (May 2 2 n d ,  20 19 )  av a i l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / /www.coon s . sen a te .gov/n ews/p ress - r e l eases / sen s -co on s-and - t i l l i s - and -rep s -co l l in s - john son-and -
s t iv e r s - r e l ease -d ra f t -b i l l - t ex t - to - re fo rm-sec t ion -10 1 -o f- th e -p a t en t - act .   
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goes against  the ethos the interoperabil ity of devices and therefore,  the potential  of 
IoT.  
Another important issue relates to the different understanding of patentabili ty 
criteria in national patent offices around the world –  for example, an invention 
might well  be considered patentable in Japan or in Europe, but rejected in the US . 
Ultimately,  this leads to competition problems between nations.  For example,  one 
nation being more generous in granting patents for AI inventions  may result  in the 
rise of li t igations between jurisdictions or intensify legal problems between patent 
regimes. Hence, this research project  evaluates the adequacy of the novelty 
requirement. 8  Properly assessing and defining prior art will be essential  in 
preventing non value-added subject-matters from being patentable and preserve the 
equilibrium of the patent system . 
This research report  adopts a comparative approach looking at  the practices of three 
of the five biggest  patent offices in the world,  namely the European Patent Office  
(EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japanese 
Patent Office (JPO). It  will  first analyze the justifications underlying the patent 
system (Section II)  before turning to  defining algorithmic innovation for the 
purpose of AI and IoT (Section III).  This section outlines the features  of the 
development of algorithms to highlight the characterist ics of modern algorithm ic 
inventions ,  providing the essential  premise for the evaluation of the current patent 
systems. When addressing the issue of opening the patent system to algorithms, the 
social  need to grant such protection (section IV) and the scope of patent protection  
for this technological field  must be established . Consequently ,  Section V deals with 
the first  hurdle for patenting algorithms. Reviewing legislation and cases,  this 
sect ion examines the excluded patentable subject -matters and emphasizes  the 
difficulties in constructing algorithms as inventions. Section VI then considers the 
need to harmonize the novelty requirement further.  Finally,  Section VII concludes 
and makes a series of modest  recommendations.  
II.  Purpose of the patent system  
Gradually,  numerous rationales and justification s have been given to support  patent 
systems.9  This research report  does not provide an extensive examination of these ,  
but focuses on the most common justifications and conceptuali zations in order to 
 
8  In f r a  sec t ion  VI .  
9  A .  Ramalho ,  'Pa t en tab i l i t y  o f  AI -Gen erat ed  In v en t ions  –  I s  a  Refo rm o f  t h e  Pat en t  Sy st em Need ed ? '  
(March  2 018 )  In s t i t u t e  o f  In t e l l ectua l  Prop er t y ,  Founda t ion  fo r  In t e l l ec tua l  Prop ert y  o f  Jap an  5 ;  L .  
Ben t ly ,  B .  Sh erman,  D .  Gan jee  & P .  John son ,  In t e l l ectua l  Pro p ert y  La w  (OUP,  5 t h  ed . ,  201 8)  397 ;  R .  
Merg es ,  Ju st i f y in g  In t e l l ec tua l  Prop er t y  (Harv ard  Univ er s i ty  P ress ,  20 11 )  Par t  I .  
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pave the way towards the discussion on whether or not patent regime s should cover 
algorithms. In i ts  most basic form, patent protection att empts to regulate  leading 
edge scientific progress.  However,  one of the most obvious difficult ies for any 
patent system is to ensure that legislation can keep pace with the advances of 
technology.  
Evaluating the different conceptuali zations for the existence of patent system s,1 0  
some have advanced natural law arguments emphasizing the need for an inventor to  
own property rights over the products result ing from their mental  labor as 
articulated by John Locke . 1 1  Also rooted in natural rights,  some relied on the 
personali ty theory propounded by Geor g Hegel.  1 2  Under this theory, inventors 
ought to be granted protection as invention s reflect  an idea of an individual and 
consequently,  a manifestation of his person ality. However, these natural  law 
arguments have found l imited support  as these would not justify any limited 
duration of patent protection , instead favoring perpetual protection.1 3   
Others have argued that justice necessitates rewarding inventors through the 
issuance of patents ,  in other words,  the reward theory  or util itarianism.1 4   Here,  
protection is justified in name of fairness and provides a proportional reward for 
the usefulness of the invention to society . However,  this theory has been crit ici zed 
for the difficulties in determining what patent protection aims to reward. Is it  the 
labor exercised by i ts inventor? Or the first to come up with the technical  idea? 
Both seem unsatisfactory.  Similarly, this theory does not justify the monopoly 
given to patentees. Rewards can take varied forms which do not have an adverse 
impact on the functioning of the market.1 5   
 
1 0  W.  L im,  'To wards  Dev elo p ing  a  Natu ra l  Law Jur i sp rud en ce in  th e  U.S .  Pa t en t  Sy st em'  (2003 )  19  Sa nt a  
Cla ra  Co mputer  & High  Tech  LJ ,  561 .  
1 1  J .  Lo ck e,  S eco nd  Trea t i se  on  Civ i l  Go vern ment ,  i n  Two  Trea t i ses  o f  Go vernmen t  (Pe t er  Las l e t t  ed . ,  
CUP,  19 88 )  ch  V ;  L im,  su pra  n .  10 ;  A.  R .  So mmer ,  'T roub le  o n  th e  Co mmon s :  A Lo ck ean  Ju s t i f i ca t ion  
fo r  Pa t en t  Law Harmo niza t io n '  (2005 )  87  J  Pat  & Tra d ema rk Of f  So c ' y  14 1;  D .  Gu el l ec  & B .  v an  
Pot t e lsb ergh e  d e l a  Po t t e r i e ,  Th e econo mics  o f  th e  Euro p ean  pa ten t  sys t em :  IP  po l i cy  f o r  inno vat ion  an d  
co mp et i t ion  (OUP,  20 07 ) ;   Bent ly  and  al ,  su pra  n .  9 ,  397 .  
1 2  J .  Hugh es ,  'Th e  Ph i lo sop hy  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  P rop er ty '  (19 88)  7 7  GEO.  L . J . ,  3 29.  
1 3  Th i s  ju s t i f i cat ion  can  b e  foun d  in  th e  F ren ch  Paten t  Law o f  1 791 .  
1 4  P .  J .  Hea ld ,  'A  Tran sac t io n  Co s t s  Th eory  of  Pat en t  Law '  (20 05 )  66  OHIO S T.  L . J . ,  47 3 ;  'Ex  An te  Versu s  
Ex  Po s t  Ju s t i f i cat ion s  fo r  In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty '  (2 00 4)  71  U. CHI.  L .  REV. ,  12 9.  
1 5  E .C .  He t t in g er ,  ‘ Ju s t i fy in g  In t e l l ectu a l  P rop er ty ’  (1 989)  1 8  Phi lo so ph y  and  Publ i c  Af fa i r s ,  31 -52 .  
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A more popular justification is the incentive theory. 1 6  Primarily rooted in economic 
considerations, it  is  independent from whether justice requires inventors to be 
rewarded for their endeavors. 1 7  It  purports that the possibili ty of gett ing a 
monopoly is attractive enough to encourage innovation and is the most appropriate 
form of return for the intellectual  labor deployed. Likewise, the disclosure 
requirement provides an incentive for others to invent around an invention and in 
turn, receive protection. 1 8  Yet again, this theory is not without flaws. It  rel ies on 
the premise that  patents are the most effective way in which these incentives can 
be provided. Furthermore, this  theory can be crit icized as patents can act  as a 
double-edged sword that  may either encourage innovation or block i ts  progress. 1 9  
It  also presumes that  the value of the invention outweighs the increased costs to 
consumers  and that consumers will be in a posit ion to pay these higher costs .2 0   
The public interest  rationale appears to be the most popular  today and thus,  the 
patent system is ‘public-serving’ .2 1  Protection is justified because of the societal  
benefits  result ing from the grant ing of patents over t ime.2 2  The only way to justify 
the harm endured by consumers is if the public receives some corresponding benefit . 
This means that the place of the inventor is  secondary in this conceptuali zation of 
patent protection. The exclusive rights granted through  the patent mediate the trade-
off between incentive and access  -  not only in terms of duration , but also in other 
aspects of the scope of protection.  Whilst  ‘access’ was initial ly conceived as to the 
 
1 6  E .  Derc l ay e ,  ' P a t en t  l aw’s  ro l e  in  t h e  pro t ec t ion  o f  t h e  env i ron men t  –  r e - assess ing  p a t en t  l aw and  i t s  
ju s t i f i ca t ion s  in  t h e  2 1 st  cen tu ry '  (200 9)  40 (3 )  I IC ,  253-255 .  
1 7  E .g .  in  th e  US  th e  l ang u age  of  th e  co n st i t u t ion a l  b as i s  fo r  in t e l l ec tu al  p rop er ty  p ro t ec t ion  wh ere  th e  
co ns t i t u t ion  g ran ts  po wer  to  con gress  und er  ar t i c l e  1 ,  Sec t ion  8 ,  C lau se  8  a nd  s t r es ses  th e  pu rp o se o f  
p rog ress  o f  sc i en ce  as  th e  foun d at ion  fo r  t h e  US  p a t en t  sy s t em.  For  more ,  see  A .  D .  Min sk ,  'Pa t en tab i l i t y  
o f  Algo r i th ms :  A Rev iew an d  Cr i t i ca l  An a ly si s  o f  th e  Cu r ren t  Do c t r in e '  (1992 )  8  San ta  C la ra  High  Tech .  
L . J ,  2 85 -288 .  
1 8  US:  §1 12  35  US Co d e;  JP :  a r t i c l e  3 6  JPA;  Eu ro p e:  a r t i c l e  8 3  EPC.  
1 9  Eu ro p ean  Co mmiss io n ,  S tud y on  eva lua t ing  th e  kno wledg e  econ o my:  wha t  a re  pa ten t s  a ctua l l y  wo r th?  
Th e va lu a t ion  o f  p aten t s  f or  t oda y’ s  econo my and  soc i e t y  ( f in a l  r epo r t ,  2 3  Ju ly  20 06 )  1 0 .  
2 0  Wh ich  i s  no t  th e  case  fo r  many  d ev elop ing  cou nt r i es .  C .  F in ck  and  C .A.  P r imo  Brag a ,  ‘Ho w s t rong er  
p ro t ec t io n  o f  in t e l l ec tu a l  p rop er ty  r igh t s  a f f ect s  i n t e rn a t ion al  t r ad e  f lo ws’  in  C.  Fin ck  and  K.E.  Masku s  
( ed . ) ,  In t e l l ectua l  Prop ert y  and  Deve lop ment :  l e s so ns  f ro m recent  econo mic resea rch  A co -pu bl i ca t io n  
of  th e  Wor ld  Bank  and  Ox fo rd  Univ er s i t y  Press ,  200 5) .  
2 1  R.  Tu shn e t ,  ‘ In t e l l ec tu a l  Pro p er ty  as  a  Pu bl i c  In t eres t  Mech ani sm’ in  R.  Drey fuss  & J .  P i l a  ( ed s . ) ,  Th e  
Oxfo rd  Handb oo k o f  In t e l l ec tua l  Prop er t y  La w (OUP,  2 018 )  100 .  
2 2  See Asah i  Ka se i  Kog yo  [1 991 ]  RPC 485 ,  52 3  (HL) ;  Gra cewa y  Ph a rma ceu t i ca l s  LLC v  Perr igo  
Co  ( 2010 )  722  F .  Supp  2d  566 ,  58 0  (Di s t r i c t  Co ur t  (Dis t r i c t  o f  New Je r sey ) ) .  
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public’s access to improvement s and inventions,  i t  morphed into referring to the 
invention’s disclosure  which occurs when a patent applicatio n is published, thereby 
facil itat ing the dissemination of  knowledge and information. 2 3  Prior to having a 
patent system, individuals would protect  their invention through trade secret s to 
maintain their competitive advantage. By having a balanced patent system, granting 
patents acts as incentive for individuals and organizations  to disclose knowledge 
that  would otherwise be concealed. The nature of the information is equally 
valuable.2 4  For example,  the European Patent Convention (‘EPC’) requires that  the 
invention be disclosed in a manner that  is  sufficiently clear so that  it  can readily 
be put into pract ice.2 5   
Regardless  from its justification , there is  no denying that the patent system acts as 
a regulatory tool with a strong economic nature  aimed at encouraging technological  
innovation as well  as the transfer and dissemination of technology in society .  This 
represents a  challenge for regulators as they need to strike a balance between 
providing adequate protection to foster innovation whilst preventing the expansion 
of patents. 2 6   
Patent law protects inventions ,  but very few patent laws define what an invention 
actually is .  This is  the case in Europe where the term ‘invention’ is  defined 
negatively through a list  of excluded subject -matters. 2 7  Even here,  the l ist  is  
excluded ‘as such’  -  meaning that  there are ways in which  inventions involving 
these excluded subject -matters can be protected. 2 8  Contrastingly , the Japanese 
Patent Act does provide some broad definit ion where an invention is defined as ‘a 
highly advanced creation of technical ideas util izing the laws of nature’. 2 9   
 
2 3  Bent ly  and  al ,  su pra  n .  9 ,  397 .  
2 4  WIPO In t e rn a t ion a l  Bu reau ,  ”Enlarg ed”  co n cep t  o f  n o vel t y -  in i t ia l  s tud y  co ncern in g  n o vel t y  and  th e  
pr io r  a r t  e f f ec t  o f  cer ta in  app l i ca t ion s  und er  d ra f t  a r t i c l e  8 (2 )  o f  t h e  S PLT  (20 04 )  4  av ai l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / /www.wip o . in t / ex po r t / s i t e s /www/scp /en /nov e l ty /do cu ment s /5p rov .p df  
2 5  Sup ra  n .  1 8 .  
2 6  Ramalh o ,  sup ra  n .  9 ,  8 .  
2 7  Ar t i c l e  52 (2 )  EPC;  Guid e l in es  fo r  Ex amin a t ion  in  t h e  Eu rop ean  Paten t  Off i ce ,  Par t  G - I I ,  p a ra  1 .  
S imi l a r ly ,  in  th e  US ,  th e re  i s  no  s t a tu to ry  d e f in i t i o n  wh ich  l ed  scho la r s  to  d ev i se  wo rk ab le  d e f in i t io n s .  
H.  E .  Po t t s ,  ‘Th e d ef in i t io n  o f  inv ent ion  in  p a t en t  l aw’  (19 44 )  7 (3 )  Th e  Mo d ern  La w Rev iew,  11 3-123 .  
2 8  In f r a  sec t ion  V-1 .  
2 9  Ar t i c l e  2  JPA.  
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Underlying these excluded subject -matters lies the fear of granting a monopoly to 
an unworthy invention or of impeding on downstream innovation .3 0  The categories 
of excluded subject-matters make an attempt at  ensuring that  only ‘worthy’  objects 
are granted a limited monopoly. 3 1  Exclusions such as the one relating to  computer 
programs were mainly motivated by poli tical  and economic reasons. 3 2  Surprisingly,  
in Europe, there is  li tt le guidance to be found in  the travaux préparatoires  to 
understand the justifications underlying these categories of exclusions. 3 3  The EPO 
Guidelines (Part  G, Chap. II,  1) merely indicate that  some subject -matters are 
excluded because these are deemed as too abstract  (e.g.  scientific theories or 
mathematical  methods) and/or non -technical  (e.g.  presentations of information).  
Algorithms would generally fall  within one of these categories .  In the seminal  
Vicom  case, 3 4  an invention involving a mathematical  method applied to data 
resulting in an enhanced digital  image on a computer was held to be purely 
intangible and intellectual ,  and as such could not be patentable.  However,  a device 
that  deploys this method can be protected if  i t  encompasses a technical  character.  
Similarly,  in the US, where computer programs were protected as early as 1964 by 
copyright,  the judiciary init ially  excluded computer programs and algorithms from 
the scope of patent law as these constitute a subset  of the abstract  ideas’  exclusion 
of 35 USC §101.3 5   
Beyond the concern of wanting only  to protect worthy inventions,  patentabil i ty 
requirements were also introduced having in mind granting property rights for 
physical  embodiments of ideas  in parallel  with  useful and industrial  applications of 
 
3 0  Th e  p reemp t io n  r a t ion a le  i s  e sp ec i al ly  r e l ev an t  in  th e  US.  See Go t t scha lk  v  Benso n  (197 2)  409  US 63 ,  
175  USPQ 673  (Ben son ) ,  72 ;  Ma yo  co l labo ra t i ve  S erv i ces  v  Pro meth eu s  Labo ra to r i es  (20 12 )  5 66  US  66  
(Ma yo ) ,  91 .  Ho wev e r ,  th e re  are  o th e r  ju s t i f i cat ion s  p oss ib l e .  Fo r  a  su mmary ,  see  Cong ress ion al  Research  
Serv i ces ,  Pa ten t - e l ig ib l e  Subjec t  Ma t t er  Re fo rm in  th e  11 6 t h  Cong ress  (Sep temb er  17 t h ,  2 019 )  25 -26  
av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / / f as .o rg / sgp /cr s /mi sc/R45 918 .pd f  
3 1  C.  D.  Tho mas ,  ‘Secre t  p r io r  a r t -g e t  you r  p r io r i t i e s  s t r a igh t ’  (199 6)  9 (1 )  Ha rva rd  Jo urna l  o f  La w & 
Techno log y  14 8  
3 2  R .  Hi l ty  an d  C .  Ge ig er ,  ‘Pa t en t ing  So f tware?  A Judic i a l  an d  so cio -eco no mic an alys i s ’  (2 005 )  36 (6 )  
I IC ,  620 .  See  a l so  in  Ma yo ,  sup ra  n .  30 ,  a t  71  wh ere  th e  cou r t  say s  t h at  t h e  exc lu s ion s  a re  ju s t i f i ed  as  
th i s  r esu l t  in  ‘b asi c  too l s  o f  sc i en t i f i c  and  t ech nolo gica l  w o rk s ’ .  
3 3  J .  P i l a ,  ‘Ar t .  5 2(2)  o f  th e  Conv en t ion  on  th e  Grant  o f  Eu ro p ean  Paten t s :  wh at  d id  th e  f r amers  in t end ?  
A s tudy  o f  t h e  t r av aux  p répara to i r es ’  (200 5)  3 6  I IC  755;  E .D.  Vendo se ,  ‘ In  th e  foo t s t ep s  of  th e  f r amers  
of  th e  Europ ean  Pa ten t  Co nv ent ion :  ex amin i ng  th e  t r av aux  prép ara to i r es’  (200 9)  31 (7 )  EIPR,  353 .  
3 4  T2 08/84 ,  Vico m/co mp uter - rela t ed  in ven t ion  (1 7  Ju ly  19 86 )  ECLI:EP :BA:1 986 :T0 2088 4.1 9860 715 .  
3 5  Th e  US  Su preme Cou r t  he ld  in  Ben son  th a t  math emat i ca l  a lgo r i th ms  were  no t  p a t en tab le  sub ject -
mat t e r .  Ben son ,  sup ra  3 0 ,  71 -7 2 .  See  in f ra  sect ion  V -3 .    
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the time.3 6  The novelty requirement consti tutes the  first  barrier  to patentabil ity and 
prevents  the protection of the re-invention of the wheel.  Guaranteeing that  matters 
that have fallen into the public domain are not once again brought under the control  
of private entit ies  and preventing double-patenting,3 7  novelty protects  individuals  
who have been using a product or process publicly from being prevented from doing  
so because a patent has been granted over  two or more substantially s imilar 
inventions.3 8  Truly,  the novelty requirement establishes boundaries between what 
belongs to society and what can be privately owned. Because of this part icular role, 
the concept of ‘novelty’ differs from its ordinary meaning. Under patent law, an 
invention must be new in the sense that  i t  does not form part  of the prior art  which 
is defined broadly.3 9  The question that patent examiners seek to answer is whether  
the same invention has been made available to the public before the fi ling or  
priority date  and explains why it  is  not accepted to combine different pieces of 
prior art for the assessment of novelty.   
Let’s take a common example of the self -driving car. Companies are not as 
interested in protecting the self -driving car  in itself.  They would prefer to protect  
underlying inventions such the field -of-view object recognition performed by the 
sensors of the car replicating the human abil ity to discern objects in a particular 
environment.  More generic concepts such as deep learning or machine learning 
algorithms involving data collection and analysis  capabil i ties  that  are crucial  to the 
training of the AI solution. If  we allow the protection of such invention, i t  may well  
be that later applications fall  foul of protection under the application of the novelty 
requirement.  Therefore,  to evaluate its  adequateness,  it  is  important to answer the 
policy question of if  a patent has been granted over such invention, to what extent  
should the granted patent prevent the issuance of subsequent patents covering 
identical  (or at  least  similar subject -matters)? This links to how we conceive two 
inventions being similar, and, if the subsequent in vention is in some way dissimilar 
but obvious from the earl ier patented invention, whether i t  could be barred from 
being patented in turn . Ultimately,  a strong conception of the novelty requirement 
contributes to the social  goal pursued by the patent parad igm as small  improvements 
on information already found in the public domain will be insufficient to receive a 
20-year monopoly.4 0   
 
3 6  Dia mo nd v  Cha kraba r t y  ( 1980 )  447  US 303 ,  3 08  ( Cha kraba r t y ) .  
3 7  WIPO In t e rn a t ion a l  Bu reau ,  su pra  n .  24 ,  7 .  
3 8  Ib id ,  4 .  
3 9  In f r a  sec t ion  VI .  
4 0  Nov e l ty  co mb in ed  wi th  inv ent iv e  s t ep  o r  non -o bv iousn ess ,  on ly  r end er s  p a t en tab le  inv en t ion s  wh ich  
mak e  a  s ign i f i can t  imp rov emen t  on  p r io r  a r t .  Th i s  p os i t ion  i s  n ev er th el ess  no t  sh ared  by  Sco tch mer  &  
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In sum, the patent system provides a mechanism to foster innovation. A social  
contract takes place between the state and the patentee with obligations on both 
sides.  The state grants a l imited monopoly to the inventor in exchange for the 
disclosure of the invention. At the core of this system is the desire to strike a 
balance between the interests of society and those of the patentee.  There is 
consequently a crucial need to ensure an appropriate procedure to prevent patents 
of l it tle worth from being granted easily,  as these could also be used against 
competitors as a threat.  Furthermore, this makes the process of examining a patent  
application even more important.  As such, i t  should be more than a box -ticking 
exercise and include the assessment of multiple policy considerations,  designed to 
reflect policy objectives sought by the patent system itself.    
III. Definition of AI for the purpose of IoT 
The first  difficulty relates to defining AI. 4 1  AI is  a dynamic concept referring to  
the development of computer systems able to perform human -like tasks such as 
speech recognition, visual perception , problem-solving, and decision-making. In 
light of the variety of types of AI and the absence of a consensus over i ts  
definit ion, 4 2  i t  is  best  to think of AI as a spectrum, 4 3  ranging from technology using 
human reasoning cognitive functions  as a model to perform specific tasks  (weak or 
narrow AI) to an AI program which is capable of human reasoning and perform 
intellectual  tasks (strong or broad AI). 4 4  A ‘weak AI’ generally consists of a  
 
Green  who  a rgu e  th a t  a  weak er  no v el ty  r equ i remen t  he lp s  th e  so ci a l  go a l  o f  d i sc lo su re .  S .  Sco tch mer  an d  
J .  Green ,  ‘Nov e l ty  and  d i sc lo su re  i n  p a t en t  l aw’ ,  (1990 )  21 (1 )  Th e RAND Jo urn al  o f  Econ o mics ,  132 .  
Surpr i s ing ly ,  th i s  was  sh ared  b y  on e  o f  in t e rv i ewees ,  t h i s  sch ola r  wo uld  ev en  go  as  f a r  a s  a rgu ing  th at  
wi th  a  s t rong  inv en t iv e  s t ep  r equ i rement ,  th e  no v el ty  r equ i rement  i s  no t  n ecessa ry .  
4 1  J ap an ese In s t i tu t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  P ro p er ty ,  Found a t ion  fo r  In t e l l ec tu al  P rop er ty ,  Resea rch  Rep or t  o n  
Ho w Crea t ion s  Mad e wi th  th e  Use  o f  AI  and  Da ta  fo r  3D Pr in t ing  S hou ld  Be Pro tect ed  u nd er  Ind u st r ia l  
Prop er t y  Law  (Feb ru ary  2017 )  5 -7 ;  A .  Hi ru t a ,  ‘T rea tmen t  o f  Inv ent ion s  Crea t ed  wi th  th e  Use o f  AI ’  
(201 7)  1  IP  Jou rnal ,  6 ;  Min i s t ry  of  In t e rn al  Af fai r s  and  Co mmunica t ion s ,  2 016  Wh i t e  Pap er  -  Presen t  
and  Fu tu re  o f  Ar t i f i c ia l  In t e l l i g en ce  (AI)  (201 6)  23 3 .  
4 2  Recent ly ,  th e  USPTO inv i t ed  su b miss ion s  as  to  wh at  AI  in v ent io ns  mean .  Acco rd ing  to  t h e  Asso c iat io n  
fo r  th e  P ro t ec t io n  of  In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty  (AIPPI ) ,  AI  inv ent ion  can  r efe r  t o  a  wid e  r ang e  o f  act iv i t i e s  
in clud ing  th e  p rob lem to  b e  add ressed ,  t h e  s t ru c tu re  of  t h e  d at ab ase  on  wh ich  the  AI  t r a in s  and  l earn ,  th e  
t r a in ing  of  t h e  a lgo r i th m on  th e  d a t a ,  th e  a lg or i th ms th emse lv es ,  t h e  r esu l t s  o f  th e  AI  inv ent ion ,  th e  
pa ramete r s  ad opted  an d  p oss ib ly  ev en  more .  AIPPI  wr i t t en  co mmen t s  sub m iss ion  b efore  th e  USPTO,  
Dep ar tmen t  o f  Co mmerce,  [Do ck et  No .  PTO – C– 201 9–002 9]  (Nov 12 ,  20 19 ) ,  2 .  
4 3  F raser ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  30 7;  R .  Ab bo t t ,  ' I  Th ink ,  Th ere fore  I  In v en t :  Crea t iv e  Co mp ute r s  and  th e  Futu re  o f  
Pat en t  Law '  (201 6)  57 (4 )  B .C.L .  Rev . ,  10 93 .   
4 4  A  co mmon ex amp le i s  Alph aGo.  
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computer system focusing on a single task and works on pre -programmed algorithms 
designed by humans (rule -based systems).  A strong AI is even harder to define in 
the sense that it  is hard to understand how the computer system reacts to particular  
information and what triggers a particular decision or solution to a problem  as i t  i s  
said to mimic human intuit ion (learned-based system). 4 5  It  nevertheless mainly 
relies on clustering and association to process data.  It is this type of AI which may 
rely on machine learning 4 6  or deep learning 4 7 .   
The way in which they attempt to solve a problem and who does the actual  learning 
differs .  It  can either be the human behind the system or the system itself .  Take the 
common example of a system trying to differentiate cats from dogs. A machine 
learning algorithm requires human intervention to structure the training data into 
two categories:  (1) images of dogs and (2) images of cats.  The system studies  and 
learns from this structured data to subsequently  be able to differentiate images of 
cats and dogs. 4 8  Deep learning networks do not need to have pre-labelled data to 
learn the differences between images of cats and dogs.  Instead, the neural  network 
will  send the input data through various layers of a network, using numerous 
algorithms,  and each of these layers will  hierarchically define the features of the 
different images through the use of parameters (weighing coefficients representing 
the connection strength between neurons) . 4 9  There is  no need for human 
intervention to produce an output. 5 0  Human intervention will nevertheless be 
necessary to design the layout and structure of the neural network as well  as how 
neurons are connected, what will  trigger these,  the parameters , and the training 
 
4 5  Th i s  i s  o f t en  r e fe r red  to  as  th e  ‘b l ack  box ’ .   
4 6  In  sho r t ,  a  sub set  o f  AI  in volv ing  th e  c rea t ion  of  a lg or i th ms  wh ich  can  t r an s fo rm i t se l f  wi thou t  hu man  
in t e rv ent ion  to  produ ce  a  sp ec i f i c  ou tpu t .  Th e d at a  f ed  in to  th e  AI  p rog ram n eed s  to  b e  s t ru c tu red .  
4 7  Mean ing  a  sub ca teg ory  o f  mach in e  l ea rn ing  wh ere  th e  sy s t em c rea t es  a lgo r i thms  in  t h e  same way  a s  
fo r  mach in e  l ea rn ing  bu t  i t  d i s t ing ui sh es  i t se l f  by  th e  nu mero u s  l ay er s  o f  a lgor i th ms  u sed .  Each  l ay er  
p rov id es  a  d i f f e ren t  r eact ion  and  in t e rp re t a t ion  to  t h e  d a t a  f ed  th e re to .  Th i s  i s  wh a t  i s  co mmon ly  r e fe r red  
to  as  ‘ ar t i f i c i a l  n eu ra l  n e two rk ’  and  do es  no t  n ecessa r i ly  r equ i re  s t ru c tu red  d a t a  to  op erat e .  
4 8  Giv en  th e  n eed  fo r  s t ru c tu red  d a t a ,  th ese  a lg or i th ms  a re  no t  su i t ab l e  to  so lv e  co mp lex  p rob lems  re ly in g  
on  h ug e d at ase t s .  
4 9  In  r eal i ty ,  d eep  l earn ing  wou ld  no t  b e  used  fo r  su ch  a  s imp le  t a sk .  Ho wev er ,  th i s  ex ample  serv es  as  an  
i l lu s t r a t ion  to  un d er s t and  th e  d i f f eren ces  b etween  b o th  ty p es  o f  AI .   
5 0  Ho wev er ,  i t  wi l l  g en eral ly  r equ i re  mu ch  mo re  d a t a  t h an  a  mach in e  l ea rn ing  a lgo r i th m to  b e  ab l e  t o  
id en t i fy  con cept s ,  d i f f erences  and  s imi l ar i t i e s .  Da ta -Rela t ed  Asse t s  Repo r t ,  supra  n .  2 ,  23 .  
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methods. Human intervention is also relevant to correct  errors if  the output is  not 
the desired one. 5 1   
To perform a task, AI relies on algorithms. Whether these algorithms are already 
known and form part of the prior art ,  there are also learned models built  only by 
the human conducting the learning. Although in rule-based systems, the human 
writes the entire algorithm to be implemented by the machine, learning systems 
involve adaptive algorithms. These do not solely rely on massive amounts o f data 
but they also involve significant amount of computational resources and t ime.  To 
put i t  simply, learned models require a large amount of investment. Additionally,  
AI programs refer to an intangible and invisible activity, removed from the end -
product which has tradit ionally been the focus of patent law.  
  
 
5 1  L.  Ver t in sky  & T.  M.  Ric e ,  ‘Th ink ing  abou t  th in k in g  machin es :  imp l i ca t ion s  of  mach in e  inv ento r s  fo r  
pa t en t  l aw’  (20 02 )  8 (2 )  B.  U.  J .  S ci .  & Tech .  L . ,  58 6 .  
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Figure 1.  Overall  process of  strong AI program development  
 
(source: the author)  
Figure 1 represents an il lustration of the overall  process of strong AI program 
development. The learning process starts with the aggregation of data ,  which may 
be derived from a variety of sources such as user input,  sensors affixed on objects , 
or monitoring of user behavior .  Because this vast amount of data is likely to include 
errors,  a pre-processing phase is  necessary to remove errors and biases  and to avoid 
data skews as the overall  goal is for the AI program to identify patterns and features 
in a given dataset .  However, there may be multiple features in one dataset ,  and it  
may be extremely costly to define and quantify each feature . Here,  the algorithm is 
able to reduce the waste by focusing on certain features in the pre -processed phase 
(i.e.  dimensionali ty reduction).  This reduces waste of computational capacity but  
simultaneously reduces the amount of insights and information that  may be derived 
from a particular dataset .  The next phase relates to the AI program’s attempt to fi t 
the dataset into predetermined models .  Generally, several sets are involved. 5 2  There 
is  the training set  which the algorithm attempts to fit  within one of the 
predetermined models  by applying parameters  to it ,  then there is  the validation set  
which is used to evaluate error rates of each model for data outside the dataset  and 
finally,  there is  the test  set ,  which is used to generate a report  on the accuracy of 
the selected model.   
 
5 2  Fo r  mo re ,  see  A.  Ng,  Ad vice fo r  a pply in g  ma ch in e l earn in g:  Mod e l  S e l ect ion  a nd  Tra in /Val ida t ion /Tes t  
Se t s ,  h t t p s : / /www.course ra .org / l ea rn /mach in e - l ea rn ing / l ecture /QGKb r/mo d el - se l ect ion -an d- t r a in -
va l id at ion - t es t - se t s .  
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AI programs do not init iate the invention process. 5 3  And whilst the AI of today is 
better conceived as a tool used by humans 5 4  mainly l imited to performing specific 
tasks,5 5  some have noted that  a lot  of innovation remains in this area and that  in a 
few decades,  AI could very well exceed human capabili ties. 5 6  At this stage, it  is  
hard to predict  the future of the technology in the long - or even mid-term.5 7  What 
is  nevertheless certain is  that  computer technology continues to progress rapidly 
and is likely to transcend every industry known today  (e.g.  manufacturing, 
financial,  medical , polit ics and content industries) .5 8   
Another characterist ic of AI is  that  once an efficient algorithmic solution has been 
found, i t  can be applied to a series of different complex problems in related or  
unrelated fields. Furthermore, these programs enable new forms of experimentation 
by simulating complex systems, ult imately enabling costs and time saving. 5 9  If  most 
algorithms are known, where does the innovation l ie in machine learning? 6 0  Today’s 
AI computational models rely heavily on huge amounts of data. The algorithms of 
 
5 3  A  recen t  emp i r i ca l  s tudy  in to  th e  ro l e  o f  th e  h u man  in  th e  fu tu re  o f  th e  inn ov a t ive  p ro cess  d emon s t ra t es  
th at  r espon d en t s  b e l i ev ed  th a t ,  wh en  d ea l ing  wi th  AI ,  h u man s would  mos t ly  ca r ry  ou t  th e   s t ep  of  
id en t i fy ing  th e  problem to  be so lv ed  r a th e r  th a t  se l ec t in g  t h e  way s in  wh ich  th e  p ro blem cou ld  b e so lv ed  
or  as sess ing  th e  f eas ib i l i ty  o f  t h e  r esu l t ing  so lu t ion .  Hi ru t a ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  7 ;  Jap an ese  In s t i tu t e  o f  
In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty ,  Fo u nd at ion  fo r  In t e l l ec tu a l  P rop er ty ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  26 ;  co nf i rmed in  AIPPI ,  sup ra  n .  
42 ,  4 ;  Ver t in sk y  and  R ice ,  ‘Thinking  abou t  th in k ing  machin es :  impl i cat io n s  o f  machin e  inv ento r s  fo r  
pa t en t  l aw’  (20 02 )  8 (2 )  B.  U.  J .  S ci .  & Tech .  L . ,  58 6 .                                                                                                                                  
5 4  Min i s t ry  of  In t e rn a l  Af fa i r s  and  Co mmu nica t ion s ,  supra  n .  4 1 ,  233 .  
5 5  To d ay ’s  AI  can  do  mo re than  ach iev ing  pre -d e f in ed  t ask s  an d  so me in c lud e  th e  ab i l i ty  to  au tono mou sly  
c reat e ,  t e s t  an d  mak e d ec i s ion s  as  to  a  so lu t io n  to  imp leme n t .   
5 6  C .  Reedy ,  Ku rzwei l  c la ims  th a t  th e  s in gu la ri t y  w i l l  ha pp en  b y  2 045  (Oc to b er  5 t h ,  2017 )  av a i l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / / fu tu r i sm.co m/k urzwei l - c l a ims - th at - th e - s ingu lar i ty -wi l l -h ap p en -by -2 04 5 ;  Abbo t t ,  su pra  n .  4 3 ,  
1093 .  
5 7  Dr  Th ale r  argu es  th a t  h e  h as  no w in v en ted  an  a lg or i th m wh ich  wi l l  b eco me th e su ccessor  o f  d eep  
l earn ing ,  p av in g  th e  way  to  sen t i en t  AI .  Dr  S .  Th a le r ,  Imag ina t ion  Engin es  In c .  anno un ces  a  n ew pa ten t  
tha t  i s  a rg uab ly  th e  su ccesso r  to  d eep  l ea rn in g  an d  th e  f u tu re  o f  a r t i f i c ia l  gen era l  i n t e l l ig en ce  (Sep t  
22 n d ,  2 019 )  av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tps : / /www. l ink ed in . co m/pu l se/ imag in a t io n -eng in es - inc -an noun ces -n ew-p a t en t -
a rgu ably - th a l er -1 e / .  
5 8  Ver t in sky  and  R ice ,  su pra  n .  53 ,  576 .  
5 9  Ib id ,  579 -58 0 .  
6 0  See a l so  WIPO Stand ing  Co mmi t t ee  on  th e  Law of  Pat en t s ,  Ba ckg ro und  Document  on  Pa ten t s  a n d  
Emerging  Techno log ies  (Gen ev a ,  Jun e  24 t h -27 t h ,  20 19 ) ,  11  av ai l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / /www.wip o . in t / ed o cs /mdo cs / scp /en / scp_30 / scp_30_ 5.p df .   
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tomorrow would operate on  small  datasets, 6 1  include more efficient deep learning 
models,  new hardware ,  and be capable of unsupervised learning. 6 2  Moreover,  
innovation lies in the reasoning capabil it ies of AI algorithms.  
The realization of the promises l inked to the IoT depends on the adaptive learning 
capabil it ies of daily devices and appliances. As IoT technology pursues the goal of  
detecting, collecting , and analyzing data obtained from sensors affixed on devices 
and everyday appliances via the Internet,  IoT has the capabil ity of dramatically 
changing manufacturing efficiency.  The relationship between AI and IoT is not hard 
to grasp. As IoT naturally involves big data,  the reali zation of its  promises would 
be limited i f  we had to rely on human intell igence only. Therefore, AI programs are 
now seen as crucial  to use this big data in a meaningful way. 6 3  Similarly,  as seen 
above, the performance of machine learning systems largely depends on vast  
amounts of high-quali ty  data.   
IV. Rationale for protecting AI algorithms under patent law 
Computer science (and the development of complex AI programs for a wide range 
of different purposes) is  presumably the field presently involving the most intensive 
human innovative endeavors. 6 4  One might therefore wonder why the patent  
paradigm struggles to adapt itself to this form of innovation. The problem is not 
new. For example,  software protection appears to have always caused difficulties 
for intellectual  property law experts. 6 5  Today, the patent system remains a difficult  
regime that is  not easily intell igible and lacks clear definitions of what constitutes 
a protectable subject -matter under patent law. This results in the need for elaborate 
reasonings that ,  at  times, can come near to an elegant juggling of words and 
concepts. In an a ttempt to simplify this system and to strengthen i ts legitimacy in 
 
6 1  I t  i s  sa id  t h at  in  imag e  r eco gni t ion ,  t h ere  i s  a  n eed  fo r  a  d a t ase t  o f  ab out  15  mi l l i on  imag es  to  en ab l e  
th e  AI  p rog ram to  id en t i fy  an  ob ject .  Th i s  con s t i tu t es  an  in h eren t  l imi t a t ion  to  th e  u se  of  n eura l  n etwork s  
as  in  so me do main s  th e re  i s  n o t  su ff i c i en t  d a t a  to  b eg in  wi th .   
6 2  Wh i l s t  p rog ress  h as  b een  mad e  in  r e l a t ion  to  un sup erv i sed  l ea rn ing ,  i t  o f t en  r equi res  h u man  co rrec t ion .  
See th e  ex ample of  t r a in in g  an  AI  p rog ram to  d i f f eren t i a t e  dog s  f ro m wo lv es  wh ich  conta in ed  nu mero u s  
e r ror s .  Upo n  rewr i t ing  of  th e  a lgo r i th ms  so  th a t  t h e  sy s t em wou ld  ex pla in  i t s  d ec i s ion -mak ing  p ro cess ,  
i t  was  d emon st ra t ed  th a t  th e  AI  prog ram was  c l as s i fy in g  th e  imag es  as  dog s  or  wo lv es  b ased  on  th e  
presen ce  of  sno w in  th e  imag e .  P .  Haas ,  Th e  rea l  rea son  to  b e  a f ra id  o f  a r t i f i c ia l  in t e l l i g en ce  (Decemb er  
15 t h ,  20 17 )  TEDx  Talk  av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / /www.you tub e . co m/watch ?v =TRzBk _Ku IaM .  
6 3  M.  Sak a i ,  ' I n t e l l ec tu a l  Pro p er ty  Righ ts  fo r  Bu s in ess  Mod e l  by  AI/ Io T  Techno lo gy -Claims  and  
Descr ip t ion  for  Pa t en t  R ig ht  P ro t ec t ion '  (201 8)  71 (1 1)  Pa ten t  (Sep arat e  Volu me No.  20 ) ,  2 28 .  
6 4  On  th e  way s in  which  AI  i s  l ik e ly  to  ch ang e  th e  inv en t ion  pro cess ,  see  Hiru t a ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  7 .  
6 5  In f r a  sec t ion  IV -1 .  
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light of today’s innovation, this section presents an overview of the arguments 
supporting and opposing the protection of algorithms under patent law.  
1.  Arguments supporting the protection of  AI algorithms under patent law.  
Firstly,  copyright does not offer an adequate form of protection .  Already 
regarding software,  experts have struggled to identify the appropriate form of 
protection. As Hilty and Geiger note, 6 6  i t  is  hard to understand why a  mathematical  
formula would be on par with other creative works such as a novel.  Nevertheless,  
today, computer programs tend to be protected as creative expressions under 
copyright law. Protecting algorithms through copyright is  even more problematic  
as these come closer to ideas than expressions of ideas  which fall  outside the scope 
of copyright .  Regardless ,  it  is  doubtful  that  algorithms warrant protection for the 
life of the author plus 50 6 7  or 70 years. 6 8  In such a fast -paced technological  field,  
it  seems counterintuitive to grant a long term of protection for low creative 
expressions.  Furthermore, copyright mostly protects against l iteral  infringement of 
the text of the program as it  requires copying  for infringement to be found, result ing 
in a rather narrow scope of protection for computer scientists. 6 9  Nevertheless,  
additional relief may be found in the fact  that  not only li teral  copying is protected. 
Indeed, as courts would do with other creative works such as a novel, the first  step 
is to establish which elements have been copied. Then, courts extract  elements 
copied that  are not copyright protected and finally,  courts  compare the parts 
reproduced to establish if  originali ty  has been copied. This explains how parts of 
codes introduced simply for efficiency purposes would st il l  contribute to the 
findings of infringement. 7 0  And yet, algorithmic efficiency represents a big area 
for innovation presently.  Such innovation would probably be best  protected under 
patent law. 7 1  Here,  US courts  have paved the way. In McRo Inc. v. Bandai Namco 
Games Inc. , 7 2  the court  provided some clarification on the subject -matters for 
patent law by holding that  patent claims that  ‘focus on a specific means or method 
that  improves the relevant technology’ were not too abstract  and may be 
patentable. 7 3  Overall ,  what innovators in the field are trying to protect  is  not the 
 
6 6  H i l ty  and  Geig er ,  sup ra  n .  3 2 ,  617 .  
6 7  Th i s  i s  th e  case  in  Jap an ,  see  a r t i c l e  5 1  o f  th e  Jap anese  Copy r igh t  Ac t .  
6 8  Th i s  i s  th e  case  in  mo s t  Europ ean  coun t r i es  and  in  t he  US .  See USC T i t l e  17 ,  Ch ap te r  3 .   
6 9  H. R.  J in ,  ‘Thin k  b ig !  Th e n eed  fo r  p a t en t  r ig h t s  in  th e  e ra  o f  b ig  d at a  and  mach in e l ea rn ing ’  (20 18 )  
7(2 )  NYU  Jo u rna l  o f  In t e l l ec tua l  Prop er t y  and  En ter ta in ment  Law ,  85 -86 .  
7 0  D .  Koo,  'Pat en t  and  copy r igh t  p ro t ec t ion  of  co mp ute r  p rograms '  (2 002 )  2  IPQ,  1 96-198 .  
7 1  J in ,  su pra  n .  69 .  
7 2  (2 016 )  837  F .3d  129 9 ,  13 14 -1 5  (Fed .  Ci r . )  ( M cRo ) .  
7 3  See  in f ra  sec t ion  V-3 .  
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expression of an idea  but the ideas or concepts themselves, 7 4  making patent law 
more suitable and provides better protection against  competitors who develop 
similar solutions independently. 7 5  
Secondly, trade secrets are equally ineffective .  If  through the obtention of patent 
protection, the contents of a patent application become part of the public domain, 
trade secrets require the invention to be kept secret.  This form of protection is 
attractive as i t  does not include meeting the patentabil ity requirements established 
under patent law. Contrastingly, patent protection offers a way to encourage 
innovation and contributes to the growth of the public domain information in 
relation to a particular field of technology. 7 6  Indeed, if  an inventor knows that  a 
patent could be granted over an invention, she is  less likely to rely on trade secret 
law despite the fact  that  protection may last  longer than under patent law , provided 
that  no third party has independently obtained the secret. 7 7  However, trade secrecy 
may not be the most optimal way to deal with AI algorithmic inventions or even the 
best  strategy as generally,  the inventive process of AI programs involves numerous 
inventors from possibly different companies.  Therefore,  companies are l ikely to be 
interested in creating cross -industry all iances to share knowledge and 
information. 7 8  Patent protection could also enhance cross -industry collaboration 
with a goal to facil itate innovation even though contract  law could be used to share 
information protected as trade secrets. Where innova tion is mainly characterized as 
being incremental and cumulative, this argument gains importance. Indeed, with the 
current speed in which technology advances in this field,  there is  a real  risk that  
another company ends up disclosing the details of the sub ject-matter rapidly if kept 
as trade secret.  
Thirdly,  the current legislative framework is misleading .  It  would be a 
misconception to believe that  patent law does not reward inventors of software or 
algorithms. 7 9  Patent attorneys generally advise avoiding language such as ‘AI 
 
7 4  S .  Utk u  & A.  S t ro wel ,  'Dev e lop ment s  r eg ard in g  th e  pa t en tab i l i t y  o f  co mp ute r  imp leme n ted  inv en t io n s  
wi th in  th e  EU and  th e  US:  Par t  1  -  i n t rod u ct ion  and  the  l eg a l  p rob lem o f  p a t en t ing  co mpu ter - imp lemen ted  
inv en t ion s '  (2 017 )  39 (8 )  EIPR ,  4 90;  Koo,  sup ra  n .  70 ,  189 ;  D .  J .M.  At t r idg e,  'Ch a l l eng ing  c l a ims!  
Pat en t ing  co mpu te r  p rog rams  in  Europ e and  th e  USA'  (200 1)  1  IPQ ,  24 .  
7 5  Ib id .  
7 6  U tk u  an d  St ro wel ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  49 0;  F rase r ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  322 .  
7 7  J in ,  su pra  n .  69 ,  87 .  
7 8  I . e .  d a t a  sh ar ing  a l l i an ces .  
7 9  A t t r idg e ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  27 -28 .  Al so  cor ro bo rat ed  by  the  d a t a  f ro m th e  JPO which  d emon s t ra t es  t h at  w e  
a re  cu rren t ly  in  a  t h i rd  AI  boo m o f  p a t en t  appl i ca t io ns  wi th  p a t en t  appl i ca t ion s  ov er  co re  AI  accoun t ing  
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program’, ‘mathematical  algorithm’  or ‘algorithm’ to describe the invention so as 
not to fall  within the exclusions of patentable subject -matters.8 0  The language used 
also varies greatly from a jurisdiction to another.  For example,  Eu rope excludes 
computer programs from patentabili ty unless they bear a technical effect  or 
contribution, whilst  Japan has especially enshrined the possibil ity for patenting 
‘computer programs, etc . ’ (emphasis added). If  it  is not that  hard to get a patent f or 
an algorithmic invention by being skilled with words,  i t  is  perhaps t ime to adapt 
practices  in order to reflect that  reali ty. Equally,  there is  no denying that  if  
inventors understand that  they are more l ikely to be protected by applying in certain 
countries (l ike Japan), they will  more l ikely set  up a business there or market the 
invention in the jurisdictions where the law is on their side.  The opposite also holds  
true.  It  may also be more difficult  for inventors operating in countries where 
protection is doubtful  to attract  the necessary investment for innovative 
technologies,  as investors may fear a slower return on investment. Furthermore, the 
current system fosters a high degree of invalidity procedures. 8 1  Faced with the 
uncertainties as to what is  actually being protected, smaller players in the field who 
lack the financial backing to defend their inventions  may suffer negative effects .  
Equally,  investors may be less attracted to supporting start -ups for fear of invalidity 
procedures linked to the subject-matter eligibil ity morass currently prevail ing.  
Fourthly,  opening patent el igibili ty to AI algorithms encourages innovation and 
enhances social benefits .  The primary objective of patent law is to encourage 
innovation and ensure that the public deriv es the benefits  of these inventions.  So, 
when talking about AI algorithms, where is  the innovation? After all ,  algorithms 
are not new and merely amount to a set of instructions. Whilst the use of AI has 
assisted innovators in developing inventions for seve ral  decades, 8 2  the recent  
developments in machine learning and exponential  growth in computational powers 
is  becoming one of the biggest  drivers of innovation transcending all  fields l ike 
robotics,  healthcare,  electronics,  manufacturing, finance, genetics,  
pharmaceuticals, etc. 8 3  Consequently,  enabling the protection of AI algorithms as 
patentable would be consistent with the justifications and purposes of the patent 
 
fo r  a lmo s t  a  th i rd  o f  th ese  p a t en t  app l i ca t ion s .  JPO,  Recen t  Trend s  in  A I -Re la t ed  In ven t i on s  ( Ju ly  2019 )  
av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / /www.jpo .g o . jp / e / sy s t em/p aten t /g a iyo /ai / a i_ shu t sug an_ cho sa .h tml .   
8 0  Con f i rmed  by  in t e rv i ew wi th  Jap an ese  p a t en t  a t t o rneys .  
8 1  J in ,  su p ra  n .  69 ,  10 4 .  
8 2  G.  Co n Díaz,  So f tware  r igh t s  (Ya le  Univ er s i t y  P ress  2019 )  13 -34 .  
8 3  J in ,  sup ra  n .  69 ,  9 8 -99 ;  Frase r ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  315 ;  N.  No sen go ,  Can  Ar t i f i c ia l  In t e l l ig en ce  Crea te  th e  
Next  Wond er  Ma ter ia l?  (201 6)  av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tp : / /www.n a tu re . co m/n ews/can -a r t i f i c i a l - in t e l l ig en ce -
c reat e - th e -n ex t -wond er -mater i a l -1 .1 9850  ;  Abb ot t ,  sup ra  n .  43 .  
22 
 
system. Such protection would encourage further human ingenuity in the field as i t  
recognizes the upstream creative activity deployed. 8 4  Although humans will  st il l  
innovate in this area without patent protection for AI algorithms, i t  may well  be at  
a slower pace given the efficiency or logist ical problems that  may exist .  
Simultaneously,  extending patent protection to algorithms concurs with the public 
interest  rationale of a patent system. 8 5  After al l,  as patents have an impact on 
competition and lead to an increase in prices for consumers,  there needs to be a 
very good reason to do so.  However,  arguably the absence of patent protection for 
AI algorithms could lead to less commerciali zation of useful inventions.  As Abbott 
explains, 8 6  in some industries l ike pharmaceuticals and nanotechnologies,  the 
majority of cost  incurs after the innovative process,  when the product needs to go 
through clinical trials and the acquisit ion of regulatory approv al for marketing. 
Therefore,  recognizing the innovative endeavors in the process could enhance 
commercialization of products which, bar the financial  support ,  may never reach 
the public or enable innovators to focus on the core technological advancements  
necessary.8 7   
Fifthly,  there is a risk of market failure  and recognizing the eligibil ity of 
algorithms could maintain competition  in the field.  Characterized by rapid 
incremental  innovation which leads to strong competition in the market,  large 
companies as  well  as a large number of smaller companies resulting from the fall 
in costs of computational powers are competing in the market.  As the market 
matures,  entry barriers are nevertheless emerging. 8 8  Arguably the grant ing of 
patents over AI algorithms would ensure that  not only investors keep on investing 
 
8 4  Demon s t ra t ing  th at  a lgo r i th ms  are  th e  r esu l t  o f  h u man  c rea t io n  and  no t  d i scov erab le  a r t e fac t s ,  P .  M.  
Nicho l s ,  'Br ib ing  th e  Machin e :  Pro t ec t ing  th e  In t eg r i ty  o f  Algo r i th ms  as  th e  Revo lu t ion  Beg in s '  (201 9)  
56(4 )  Amer ican  Bu sin ess  Law Jo urna l ,  780 -7 86 .  
8 5  J in ,  su pra  n .  69 ,  10 4;  F rase r ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  32 8 .  
8 6  Abbo t t ,  sup ra  n .  43 ,  11 04 .  
8 7  P.  Be l l ef l amme,  ‘Pa t en t s  an d  In cen t iv es  to  Inno va te :  So me Th eore t i cal  and  Empi r i ca l  Econ o mic  
Evid en ce’  (2006 )  13  Ethica l  Persp ec t i ves ,  27 8;  A.  Hu  an d  I .  Png  'Pat en t  Rig ht s  and  Econo mic  Gro wth :  
Evid en ce f ro m Cro ss -Cou nt ry  Pan el s  o f  Man ufac tu r ing  In du st r i es '  (20 13 )  65  Oxfo rd  Econ omic Pap ers ,  
675 .  
8 8  C.  Watn ey ,  ‘Redu cing  Ent ry  Barr i e r s  in  th e  Dev e lop men t  and  Appl i ca t ion  of  AI ’  (Octob er  2 018 )  R 
S t reet  Po l i cy  S tu d y  NO.  153 ,  1 -9 ;  Ho wev er ,  o th er s  a rgu e  th a t  b ar r i e r s  to  en t ry  are  lo wer ing  bu t  th e  
bar r i e r s  to  ex i t  in c rease .  Su ccess fu l  i nnov a to r s  b eco me v i ct im o f  th e  ‘ inn ov ato r s  d i l emma’ ,  see  M.  
Bax ter ,  Th e  Go ld en  Ag e  o f  S ta r tup s :  Techn olo g y i s  Lower ing  Ba rri ers  t o  En t ry ,  Bu t  In crea sin g  Ba r r i ers  
to  Exi t  ( Ju ly  1 2 t h ,  20 19)  av ai l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / /www. in fo rmat ion -ag e. co m/go ld en -ag e-o f - s t a r tup s -
t echno lo gy - lo wer ing -b ar r i e r s - to -en t ry - in c reas ing -b arr i e r s - to -ex i t -1234 8399 6/   
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in start -ups, but also that  undertakings would have a better idea as to the worth of 
the invention, and would make i t  easier for their  commercialization, transfer or 
licensing. 8 9  The costs of discovering or developing a new AI algorithm are 
generally high. Given the numerous risks taken and the ease with which these 
inventions may be copied, smaller players may be driven away from making 
advancements leading to less inventive activity in the field and eventua lly resulting 
in potential market failure if  no adequate protection is provided. 9 0  Furthermore, the 
current differences existing in subject -matters eligibili ty create extra costs for 
patentees which is l ikely to stifle competition and prejudice consumers.  IoT, for 
example,  uses the Internet network to share information between devices. Computer  
software and AI programs equally rely on the Internet which knows no geographical  
borders. Hence, there is a greater impact resulting from a lack of harmonization on 
competition as patentees will seek to establish their business (or at  least  market 
their invention) in countries where protection is certain.   
Sixthly,  rendering AI algorithms eligible would contribute to the realization of the 
sufficiency of disclosure requirement .  If  anything, the current si tuation fosters 
secrecy over dissemination. 9 1  Currently,  the practice shows that  inventors will  sti l l  
seek to patent their inventions without disclosing the extent of the reliance on 
complex and powerful algor ithms knowing that  the disclosure may annihilate th eir  
chance at  protection. Not only would inventors be incentivi zed to disclose more 
abstract  problems descriptions and  be st imulated to innovate,  but the application of 
the disclosure requirement enshrined  in patent law would reduce duplicative efforts 
from other parties trying to reverse engineer a particular AI program. Other 
companies can immediately build upon the patented invention. At present,  i t  is  hard 
to understand how the person skilled in the art  is able to test  the ‘enabling 
disclosure’ of a patent application in this field.  By having patent applicants disclose 
more abstract concepts (which sti ll  need to be sufficient to teach the person skil led 
in the art  to make and use the invention even if th is means relying on a computer 
as a tool for innovation),  there is  a better alignment with the justifications for the 
existence of a patent system. 
Seventhly,  i t  would promote higher quality patents .  There is presently a burden 
created for patent at torneys  (who are left to find creative solutions to protect  a 
part icular invention) and courts in infringement procedures.  By recognizing 
algorithms as eligible,  fewer patents may be granted (as many of the algorithms 
 
8 9  A l thou gh  Po sn er  coun te ra rgu ed  in  r e l a t io n  to  so f tware  p at en t s  th a t  so f tware  may  no t  b e  n ecessa ry  to  
en h an ce co mp et i t i on .  Po sner  as  c i t ed  in  Abbo t t ,  su pra  n .  43 ,  1106 .  
9 0   F rase r ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  3 15 ,  321 -322 ;  325 ;  3 27 ;  Koo ,  supra  n .  7 0 ,  196 -1 98 .  
9 1  A l thou gh  th i s  s t a t ement  i s  l e s s  r e l ev an t  fo r  t h e  US  as  exp lain ed  i s  sec t ion  VI -3 .  
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relied upon are known) but higher quali ty pat ents would be promoted because only 
the truly deserving innovative algorithms would pass the patentabili ty threshold 
and consequently, there would be a decrease in post -grant challenges. 9 2  It  is  argued 
that  there would not be a flooding of patent offices with applications over abstract 
or non-technical ideas as patent applicants know that such applications would not 
pass the patentabili ty requirements.  Whilst  this statement requires empirical  
analysis  to support  i t ,  it  is  foreseeable that companies are less likely to fi le patent 
application over small  improvements in this technological  field. 9 3   
Finally,  there would be a recognition of the  value of AI algorithms .  The primary 
value in AI algorithms is not its graphic representation but i ts  behavior . 9 4  
Therefore, AI algorithms with identical  behavior  and yet,  a different graphical 
representation result  in market substi tutes.  Additionally,  i t  is  t ime for patent law 
to adapt and recognize AI inventions removed from any hardware.  AI algorithms 
behave just l ike machines that  also produce a useful behavior.9 5  An AI algorithm is 
the process of developing and assembling functional elements such as large 
datasets.  These are large and complex - arguably, comparable to the most complex 
mechanical devices known today.9 6  In the future,  there will  be an increasing need 
to expand the scope of patent protection beyond the mere conception of protecting 
end-products implementing the AI as most inventions do not attempt to create self -
driving cars but are targeting its  bui lding blocks which are vital  to training the AI 
program.9 7  
2.  Arguments opposing the extension of patent law to algorithms  
Firstly,  there is no evidence that further incentives are necessary .9 8  The field 
being vibrant and competit ive,  there is no apparent reason for intervention and most 
 
9 2  Sco tch mer  and  Green ,  su pra  n .  40 ,  p .  132 .  
9 3  Th i s  i s  u l t imate ly  a  p o l i cy  qu es t ion .  
9 4  A t t r idg e ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  24 .  
9 5  Koo ,  sup ra  n .  70 ,  189  
9 6  A lg or i th ms a re  no t  ju s t  math :  A.  K .  Ach ary a,  'Ab s t r ac t ion  in  So f tware  Pa t en t s  ( and  Ho w to  F ix  I t ) '  
(201 9)  18 (4 )  Jo hn  M a rsha l l  Rev i ew  o f  In t e l l ectu a l  Prop er t y  Law ,  3 76;  Hi ru t a ,  sup ra  n .  4 1 ,  9 ;  Jap an ese  
In s t i tu t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  Prop er ty ,  Fo und a t ion  fo r  In t e l l ec tu a l  P ro p er ty ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  28 ;  C.  Do rman ,  'On e  
i f  by  l and ,  two  i f  by  sea :  Th e f ed eral  c i r cu i t ' s  ov er s imp l i f i ca t ion  of  co mpu te r - imp lemen ted  math emat i ca l  
a lgo r i th ms '  (2 018 )  2  Un ivers i t y  o f  I l l in o i s  Jo urna l  o f  La w,  Tech nolog y  & Po l i cy ,  2 87;  Ab bot t ,  sup ra  n .  
43 ,  110 6 .  
9 7  S.  Gok h ale ,  ‘Pendu lu m swing ing  b ack  in  AI  d i r ect ion ?’  (Decemb er  2 018 ,  Jan uary  20 19 )  IPM,  47 .  
9 8  J in ,  su pra  n .  69 ,  83 .  
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analysts advocate for the maintenance of the status quo .  9 9  Considering the recent  
study undertaken by the Japanese Insti tute of Intellectual Property, 1 0 0  their 
interview survey indicated that  companies engaging in this field desire protection 
for learned models for mainly two reasons: (1) protecting a return on investment, 
blocking entry to the field and combatting imitation; and, (2) to recognize the value 
of AI. 1 0 1  Nevertheless,  the authors report that  the majority of the respondents  
weighed against  extending protection to cover AI algorithms based mainly on the 
following arguments:  (1) trade secrets offer an adequate form of protection; (2) 
there is  no direct  correlation between patent protection over AI algorithms and the 
development of the field;  (3) there are practical  difficult ies in protecting AI 
algorithms with the necessary data; and (4) as the learned model cannot be separated 
from the program, it  already  corresponds to ‘programs, etc.’ under Japanese patent 
law.1 0 2  From the current studies, it  is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion 
in one way or another. 1 0 3  Some even recently argued that ,  if  anything, the 
exponential  growth experienced in the field and the surge of AI patents demonstrate 
that  patent law has well  adapted and no further changes are necessary. 1 0 4  However,  
there is  recognition that  existing patent law differences among jurisdictions are 
likely to have an impact on the availabil ity of patent protection for AI algorithms 
which can be costly for businesses and increase legal uncertainty. 1 0 5  
Secondly, recognizing the eligibili ty of algorithms could lead to a rise in patent 
thickets and impact competition .  Due to the incremental,  inexpensive, quickly 
superseded algorithmic innovation, 1 0 6  patent protection for algorithms could lead 
to a risk that  the field will  abound with patents where the costs of examining these 
 
9 9  See  r ecen t  s tu dy  und er t ak en  b y  th e  Jap an ese  In s t i tu t e  o f  In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty ,  F ou nd at ion  fo r  
In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty ,  su pra  n .  41 ,  32 .  
1 0 0  Ib id ,  28 -30 .  
1 0 1  Ib id ,  28 .  Al so ,  see  fo r  ex amp le th e  r i se  in  p a t en t  ap p l i ca t ion s  nu mb ers  in  th e  US fo r  c l as s  7 06  (d ea l in g  
with  AI  d a t a  p ro cess in g  sys t ems)  as  r epo r t ed  in  F .  A.  DeCo sta  & A.  G.  Car ran o ,  ‘ In t e l l ec tu a l  Prop er ty  
Pro tec t ion  fo r  Ar t i f i c i a l  In t e l l ig en ce’  (Au gu st  30 t h ,  2017 )  West la w Jo u rna l  In t e l l ec tua l  Pro p er t y ,  1 .  
1 0 2  J ap an ese  Ins t i t u t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  Prop er ty ,  Fo und a t ion  for  In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  29 .  
1 0 3  In t e res t in g ly ,  a  s imi l a r  d eb a te  o ccu r red  in  r e l a t ion  to  co mpute r  so f tware  a t  th e  t ime .  Hi l ty  and  Geig er ,  
sup ra  n .  32 ,  630 -63 2 .  
1 0 4  AIPPI ,  su pra  n .  42 ,  3 ;  Da ta -Re lat ed  Asse t s  Repo r t ,  sup ra  n .  2 ,  23 -40 .  Ho wever ,  th i s  may  b e  d u e to  
sk i l l fu l  c l a im d ra f t ing  r a the r  th an  a  r e f l ect io n  o f  th e  ad equ acy  o f  t h e  p a t en t  sys t em.  
1 0 5  AIPPI  supra  n .  42 .  
1 0 6  P.  B lok ,  ‘Th e  inv ento r ’ s  n ew too l :  a r t i f i c i a l  i nte l l ig en ce  –  ho w do es  i t  f i t  in  t h e  Eu ro p ean  p a t en t  
sy s t em?’  (201 7)  39 (2 )  EIPR ,  p .  7 3 ;  Jap an ese In s t i tu t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  P ro p er ty ,  Found a t ion  fo r  In t e l l ec tu a l  
Pro p er ty ,  supra  n .  41 ,  32 ;  At t r i dg e,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  28 -29 .  
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patents and t ransaction costs increase.  This could deter companies from developing 
new products and processes and st ifle innovation. 1 0 7  Smaller participants are also 
likely to be deterred from innovating in the field to the benefit of big corporates. 1 0 8  
Even if smaller companies have enough financial backing to innovate (and apply 
for patent protection themselves),  they st il l  need to have sufficient funds to defend 
their patent against  infringers if  needed. Major corporat ions are in a better posit ion 
to even launch vexatious infringement proceedings in order to eliminate the 
competition or sett le out of court . 1 0 9  As Attridge argued in relation to software 
patents already, even if this si tuation is not providing the necessary conditions to 
a competit ive market,  this cri t icism could be extended to the patent system in 
general.1 1 0  Whilst  the impediment of follow-up innovation is a serious concern to 
be cognizant of,  it  must be emphasized that  a monopoly would only be granted if 
the patentabil ity requirements (i .e.  novelty,  inventive step and industrial 
application) are met. These well -established cri teria of patent law will  l imit  the 
distribution of temporary monopolies as they do currently in other fields of 
innovation. 1 1 1  Moreover,  if  patent systems have accommodated AI programs 
without legislative considerations,  these technologies are arguably l ikely to have a 
longer-term impact on the patent paradigm as their use increases.  As Vaver puts 
it , 1 1 2  the inventive process is  dynamic by nature.  If  i t  operates in ligh t of 
established principles of patent law that  are amended overtime to accommodate the 
unforeseeable,  the overall  ‘trend has been towards wider protection’ 1 1 3 .  
Thirdly, there could be practical difficulties for patent offices  l inked to the 
expansion of protection to cover algorithms. This holds true given the nature of the 
knowledge required to undertake the examination of patent applications and is 
 
1 0 7  F raser ,  sup ra  n .  4 ,  322 -3 25 .  
1 0 8  Koo ,  sup ra  n .  70 ,  209 -21 0 .  
1 0 9  H i l ty  and  Geig er ,  sup ra  n .  3 2 ,  637 -6 38 .  
1 1 0  A t t r idg e ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  29 .  Al so  r ecen t ly  r e -emph asi zed  in  Ab bot t ,  su pra  n .  4 3 ,  1 105 .  
1 1 1  Eq u al ly ,  un t i l  r ecen t ly ,  t he  sy s t em p rev a i l in g  in  th e  US  h as  b een  ch arac t er i zed  o f  b e in g  mo re  l ib e r a l  
in  i t s  p a t en tab i l i ty  o f  co mpute r  p rog rams th an  in  Eu rop e .  Ho wev er ,  i t  can  h ard ly  b e  sa id  th a t  th i s  l ed  to  
a  s t ro ng er  so f tware -b ased  eco no my  in  Europ e.  See  A.  S t ro wel  and  S .  Utku ,  Th e  t ren d s  and  cu rren t  
pra c t i ces  i n  t h e  a rea  o f  pa ten tab i l i t y  o f  co mputer - imp l emen ted  in ven t ion s  wi th in  th e  EU an d  th e  US  
(201 6)  f i n al  Repo r t  fo r  th e  Eu ro p ean  Co mmiss ion ,  6 .  
1 1 2  D. Vav er ,  ‘ In v ent ion  in  Pa t en t  Law:  A Rev iew and  a  Mo d es t  P rop o sal ’  (2 003 )  11  In t erna t iona l  Jou rna l  
o f  La w and  In fo rmat ion  Tech nolog y ,  2 86-307 .  
1 1 3  Ib id ,  302 .  
27 
 
particularly valid for assessing the satisfaction of the inventive step requirement. 1 1 4  
There are concerns that if a Patent Office is faced with new and unfamiliar 
technology, i t  could lead to the grant ing of a patent to those who were first  in 
applying for patent protection. 1 1 5  This changes the nature of the test which should 
be whether a person with similar expertise would have reached the same technical 
solution or not. 1 1 6  One of the practical  difficult ies patent offices  would face is the 
identification of prior art .  Patent offices’ resources are already strained and this 
could be exacerbated if AI algorithms are eligible for patent protection given the 
incremental  nature of innovation in this field.  Even in the si tuation where patent 
offices have trained patent examiners and the appropriate instruments to understand 
and examine AI algorithmic innovation, i t  may lead to delays or the issuance of 
lower quality patents. 1 1 7  If  these patents go unchallenged, there may be negative 
consequences for the field.  However,  not only is  this argument not unique to AI 
algorithms but it  could be extended to a ny expansion of patent law which has been 
hasty and not integrated in the most optimal way. The current situation also includes 
practical  difficulties but these are generally present post -grant,  burdening courts in 
infringement procedures where judges incr easingly struggle to evaluate whether  
infringement has taken place or if  the patent should have been granted in the first 
place given the technological  expertise required.  
Lastly,  there are difficulties in identifying the object of protection .  1 1 8  Whilst the 
nature of innovation challenges the idea that AI programs do not deserve 
protection, 1 1 9  i t  is  apparent that  there are a wide range of different understandings 
as to what should be protected. As such, depending on the people consulted, 
definit ions vary. 1 2 0  Even when narrowing the object  of protection to learned models 
only, different interpretations exist .  In other words,  are we referring to the AI 
program and its  parameters or the parameters alone? In respect to the protection of 
parameters alone, interview findings did not lead to a need to further protect  these 
systems under industrial  property law. 1 2 1  In order for the patent system to be 
 
1 1 4  On AI  and  inv ent iv e  s t ep ,  see  I .  Nak ay ama,  ‘AI  and  Inv ent iv e  S tep  –  Propo sa l  o f  I ssu es’  (2 019 )  7 2(12 )  
Paten t ,  179 -19 9;  Ramalh o ,  sup ra  n .  9 .  
1 1 5  H i l ty  and  Geig er ,  sup ra  n .  3 2 ,  636 -6 37 .  
1 1 6  Wh ich  h as  h app en ed  in  t he  p ast  i n  r e l a t ion  to  b io t ech nology  and  sof twa re  p ro t ect ion .  See At t r idg e ,  
sup ra  n .  74 ,  28 -29 .  
1 1 7  H i l ty  and  Geig er ,  sup ra  n .  3 2 ,  636 -6 37 .  
1 1 8  Th i s  was  a l so  an  a rgu men t  mad e  in  r e l a t ion  to  sof tware  p a t en t s .  Utku  and  S t ro wel ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  4 93 .  
1 1 9  In f r a  sec t ion  I I I .  
1 2 0  Ib id .  
1 2 1  J ap an ese  Ins t i t u t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  Prop er ty ,  Fo und a t ion  for  In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty ,  sup ra  n .  41 ,  29 .  
28 
 
efficient,  there is  no denying that  any expansion should be duly examined and result  
from serious reflection, without w hich such a paradigm might lead to a breaking 
point.  It  also leads to broader questions ,  such as what  should patent law seek to 
protect  in the first  place. 1 2 2  Should i t be the process of reaching a specific technical  
solution or i ts  embodiment in a particular application? Afterall ,  one AI system 
might have multiple applications in numerous different fields,  many of which may 
not have been discovered at the t ime  of the application for patent protection.  
3.  Interim Conclusion  
The question as to whether AI algorithms should be eligible for patent protection 
remains unsolved. Undoubtedly,  protection of AI algorithms should only be 
authorized if patenting these innova tions fall within the purposes of the patent 
system. This section has shown that  there are a number of advantages and 
disadvantages of opening up patent protection to algorithms.   
One of the most contentious points would be to recognize AI algorithms as 
machines.  Whilst  we should operate with caution to prevent the rise of unworthy 
patents,  there is  an increasing need for the patent system to adapt to the nature of 
innovation known today. 1 2 3  Ultimately,  AI innovation remains a desirable outcome. 
Despite the current lack of economic evidence that  an expansion of patent 
protection is warranted for AI algorithms, there are strong arguments that 
demonstrate that the protection of AI algorithms is in line with the justifications 
and purpose of the patent system.   
V. The first hurdle: subject-matter eligibility 
History taught us that software protection has been cumbersome under patent law. 
In the US, a shift  occurred with the landmark case of Diamond v Diehr ,1 2 4  where 
the Supreme Court  recognized the possibil ity to grant patent protection over a 
computer-controlled process producing tangible outputs in the real  world (i .e. 
molding uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products) and thereby , 
departed from the former position that  al l  computer programs should be 
unpatentable  because of the exclusion of mathematical formula in Benson .1 2 5  Since 
Diehr ,  lower courts have attributed more attention to 35 USC §101 to determine 
 
1 2 2  Ver t in sky  and  R ice ,  su pra  n .  53 ,  587 .  
1 2 3  E .g .  th e  d i scu ss ion s  o f  a  pan el  a t  t h e  201 7  Wor ld  Econo mic Fo ru m.  Wo r ld  Econo mic Fo ru m,  Wo rl d  
Econo mic  Fo ru m Annu al  M ee t ing  20 17  S ys t em In i t ia t i ve s  Prog ra mme  (201 7)  av ai l ab l e  a t  
www3 .wefo ru m.o rg /do cs /Media /AM17/AM17 _Sy s tem_ In i t i a t i v es .p df .     
1 2 4  Dia mo nd v .  Dieh r ,  (19 81 )  450  U.S .  175  ( Dieh r ) .  
1 2 5  Sup ra ,  n .  30 .  
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whether the invention constitut es a process or a machine before turning to the 
assessment of the well -established patentabil ity requirements of novelty and 
inventive step. Upon meeting these requirements,  the invention may be 
patentable. 1 2 6   
A similar trend can be found in Europe since the leading Vicom  case,1 2 7  where the 
EPO Boards of Appeal held that  a mathematical  method to digitally process two -
dimensional data representing stored images was a patentable subject -matter 
despite the language of article 52(2) and (3) EPC indicating that computer programs 
‘as such’ are not patentable.  To reconcile the decision with the provisions,  the 
Boards of Appeal created the ‘technical effect’ doctrine whereby computer -related 
inventions need to achieve a ‘further’  technical  effect  than the physical  
modification of the computer hardware result ing from the execution of the computer 
program instructions.  Since Vicom ,  some have underlined the absurdity of 
maintaining the exclusion of computer programs from elig ible patent subject -
matters in the EPC. This possibil ity was entertained during the conference for the 
revision of the EPC in November 2000 but was eventually dropped. 1 2 8   
Japan has made that  further step. If init ial ly patent protection was excluded for 
computer-related inventions,  following a change init iated in the nineties,  computer -
related inventions are patentable provided that  these result  in ‘a highly advanced 
creation of technical  ideas uti lizing a law of nature’. 1 2 9  Nevertheless,  despite the 
legislation embracing the protection of computer -related inventions,  uncertainties 
remain in cases that blend computer programs with mathematical or business 
methods, as occurs with many algorithms. 1 3 0  Whilst  the above improvements are 
 
1 2 6  A  s imi l a r  p a th  can  b e  fo und  in  r e l a t ion  to  t h e  gra n t  o f  p at en t s  fo r  method s  of  do ing  b u sin ess .  Wit h  
th e  d ec i s io n  in  S ta t e  S t ree t  Ban k  & Tru st  v .  S igna tu re  F ina n cia l  Grou p ,  Th e  US  Cou r t  o f  App eal  fo r  t h e  
f ed eral  c i r cu i t  r ecogn ized  th a t :  ‘ a  p ract i ca l  app l i c at ion  o f  a  math emat i ca l  a lgo r i th m,  fo rmu la  o r  
ca l cu lat ion ’  sh ould  b e p a t en tab le  i f  ‘ i t  p ro du ces  a  u se fu l ,  co n cre t e  an d  t ang ib l e  r esu l t ’ .  (19 98 )  149  F .3d  
1368 ,  a t  1 374 .  
1 2 7  Sup ra  n .  3 4 .  
1 2 8  E.  Hau sman ,  M.  Co hn  an d  S .  P resen t i ,  ‘ Wil l  I sr ae l  fo l lo w th e USA,  Jap a n  an d  th e  EPO an d  a l lo w 
pa ten t  p ro t ec t ion  fo r  so f tware  s to red  on  a  s to rag e med iu m?’  (2002 )  33 (1 )  I IC ,  20 .  
1 2 9  Ar t i c l e  2 (1 )  JPA.  Reviewing  ea r ly  case  l aw in  th i s  a rea ,  see  M.  Drago ni ,  So f tware  Pa t en t - e l ig ib i l i t y  
an d  p at en tab i l i ty :  a  co mpar i son  b e tween  Jap an ,  Eu rop e  an d  th e  Uni t ed  S tat es ’  (201 8)  43 (1 )  AIPPI  
Jo urna l ,  28 -50 .  
1 3 0  JPO Gu id e l in es  fo r  Exa mina t ion ,  (20 12 )  11  and  f f .  av ai l ab l e  a t  h t tp : / /www.  
jpo .go . jp / t e tu zuk i_ e / t_ tok kyo_ e /Guid e l in es /7_1 .pd f   
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welcomed, problems remain when i t comes to patenting AI algorithms removed from 
any hardware element. 1 3 1   
1.  Europe 
Discoveries,  scientific theories,  mathematical  methods, art ist ic creations,  
performing mental acts and program s for computers are not patentable ‘as such’ 
because these do not result  in an invention for the purpose of the patent system.  
Underlying the EPC, inventions must include technical features  and be concrete .1 3 2   
An AI algorithm essentially consist s of a mathematical  method or a collection of 
algorithms can be described as mathematical  models. 1 3 3  Depending on its  
application, an algorithm, for example,  may also be considered as a scheme, a set 
of rules or method for performing mental acts, playing gam es or doing business. 1 3 4  
Bar the ‘as such’ doctrine,  AI would not be patentable in Europe. 1 3 5  To patent AI 
algorithms in Europe, there is  a need to bring the invention into a technical  sett ing 
without which the invention would be considered too abstract  to b e patented. 1 3 6   
Until  recently,  patent applicants faced great  uncertainty as to the patentabili ty of 
AI algorithms given the lack of guidance and meaningful case law in this area. 1 3 7  
With the 2019  Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (EPGL),1 3 8  
the EPO provides non-legally binding guidance on the examination of AI-related 
inventions.  Unsurprisingly,  these guidelines provide that  AI inventions are to be 
treated as other inventions involving mathematical  methods .1 3 9  Machine learning 
and learned models  rely on computational models and algorithms that  are of an 
 
1 3 1  See  US:  In  Re A lapp at  (1 994)  33  F .3d  15 26  (Fed .  C i r . ) ;  In  Re Beau rega rd  (1 9 95)  53  F .3d  158 3  (Fed .  
Ci r . ) ;  Eu ro p e:  T117 3/97  (199 8)  ECLI:EP:BA:1998 :T117 397 .199 8 0701 ;  T93 5/9 7  (19 9 9)  
ECLI:EP :BA:1 999 :T0935 9 7.19 9902 04;    
1 3 2  Rule  43 (1 )  EPC.   
1 3 3  Ex c lud ed  und er  a r t i c l e  52 (2 )(a )  EPC.  
1 3 4  Ex c lud ed  und er  a r t i c l e  52 (2 )(c )  EPC.  
1 3 5  See Reaso n s  8  o f  T15 10 /10  wh ere  th e  u se  of  mach ine  l ea rn ing  (wh ich  cou ld  be  exp an d ed  to  AI )  wi l l  
no t  b e  su f f i c i en t  in  i t se l f  t o  b e  p a t en tab le  i n  r e l a t ion  to  a  meth od  and  a r rang emen t  for  th e  r ank ing  o f  l iv e  
web  app l i ca t ion s .  (20 13 )  ECLI:EP :BA:2 013 :T1510 .20131 204 .  
1 3 6  T2 2/8 5 ,  IBM /Do cu men t  a bs t ra c t in g  a nd  re t r i eving  (198 8)  ECLI:EP :BA:1 988 :T002 285 .198 8100 5.  
1 3 7  So me gu id an ce could  b e ex t r act ed  f ro m ho w th e EPO assess  sof tware - re l a t ed  inv ent io n s .  See  EPGL ,  
Par t  G,  Ch ap .  I I ,  in  p ar t i cu l a r  3 .6  and  3 .7 .  
1 3 8  Av ai l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / /www.ep o .o rg / l aw -p rac t i ce / l eg a l - t ex t s /gu id e l in es .h tml .  
1 3 9  Fo r  an  ov erv i ew o f  th e  EPO’s  ap pro ach  to  as sess ing  wh e th er  a  so f tware  f i t s  th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  i nv en t i o n  
und er  a r t i c l e  5 2  EPC,  see  EPGL,  Par t  G,  Ch ap .  I I ,  i n  p a r t i cu l a r  3 .6  and  3 .7 .2 .  
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‘abstract mathematical nature’. 1 4 0  Therefore, to overcome the ineligibil ity as an 
invention, the invention needs to include a further technical  effect  going beyond 
the normal physical  interaction between a software and the hardware when the 
computer program is executed by the machine. 1 4 1  It  is  consequently 
counterproductive  to argue that all  computer programming  activit ies include de 
facto  a technical  character as these consist  of methods that  ought to be carried out 
by a machine or network system. 1 4 2  This being said,  if  the subject -matter includes 
a technical character,  i t  will  result  into an invention.  
This construction implies that it  is not the AI algorithm that is being patented, but 
it  is  the technical  device using AI which is the subject  of protection. Here,  it  is  
irrelevant whether the technical  means is  actually already part  of the prior art such 
as the inclusion of a computer,  computer network or other medium. App raised as a 
whole,  the invention will  be understood as eligible for patentabili ty.  
Under the EPO’s reasoning, there is  a presumption that  machine learning algorithms 
or neural  networks are non-technical  if  removed from their technical  field of 
application. 1 4 3  This non-technicali ty might not be overcome by merely specifying 
that  parameters  are of technical  nature  as i t  may be excluded on the basis that  i t  
falls under the category of performing mental  acts instead of on the  basis of the 
mathematical method exc lusion. According to the EPGL,1 4 4  the presumption of non-
technicali ty can be overcome for AI inventions if  the claim relates to a ‘technical  
application’ of a mathematical method or if the claim concerns a ‘technical  
implementation’ of a mathematical  method .   
(1)  Technical  application  
The first  way for the AI algorithm to escape ineligibil ity is  if the AI algorithm’s 
functionali ty is  limited to a specif ic  technical  purpose. 1 4 5  Some AI relevant 
 
1 4 0  EPGL,  Par t  G,  Ch ap .  I I ,  3 .3 .1 .  
1 4 1  T1 173 /97 ,  su pra  n .  1 31  and  co nf i rmed  in  G3 /08  (20 10)  ECLI :EP :BA:20 10:G0 00308 .20 1005 12.  
1 4 2  Ib id .  
1 4 3  Th i s  i s  in  l in e  wi th  th e  EPO case  l aw.  See  for  ex amp le T11 94 /97  wh ereby  a  co mpu te r - imp lemen t ed  
da t a  s t ru cture  was  h eld  as  h av ing  t echn ical  ch arac t er .  Ad opt in g  a  r eason ing  a con t ra r io ,  mere ly  
desc r ib ing  d a t a  co l l ec t io n  on  a  log ica l  l ev e l  do es  n o t  amoun t  t o  a  t echn ica l  ch arac t e r .  T11 94/97 ,  d a t a  
s t ru ctu re  p rodu c t /Ph i l ip s  (2000 )  ECLI:EP:BA:2000 :T119 4/9 7 .2 0000 315 .  
1 4 4  EPGL,  Par t  G,  Ch ap .  I I ,  3 .3 .  
1 4 5  I n  acco rd an ce wi th  T12 27/05 ,  Circu i t  s imula t ion  I / In f in eon  Techno log ies  (2 00 6 )  
ECLI:EP :BA:2 006 :T1227 0 5.20 0612 13  and  T13 58/09 ,  Cla ss i f i ca t io n /BDGB En terp ri se  So f twa re  (201 4)  
ECLI:EP :BA:2 014 :T1358 0 9.20 1411 21 in  r e l a t ion  to  co mpute r  p rog rams  bu t  which  can  p rov id e  gu id an ce 
fo r  AI  p ro t ect io n  too .  G1 /19 ,  a  r e fe r ra l  case  in  r e l a t ion  to  co mpu te r - imp lemen ted  s imu lat ion  method s i s  
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examples are provided such as ‘controlling a specific technical  system or process,  
e.g.  an X-ray apparatus or a steel  cooling process’;  ‘digital  audio,  image or video 
enhancement or analysis,  e.g.  de-noising, detecting persons in a digital  image, 
estimating the quali ty of a transmitted digital audio signal’; ‘separation of sources 
in speech signals; speech recognition, e.g.  mapping a speech input to a text output’; 
and, ‘providing a medical diagnosis by an automated system processing 
physiological  measurements’. 1 4 6  Furthermore, the mere possibil i ty that  a 
mathematical  method may serve a technical  purpose will  not be sufficient.  Care 
must be taken so that  the claims are drafted in such a way that  these are essentially 
limited to the technical  purpose. The technical  purpose of a mathematical  method 
will hinge upon the direct technical relevance of the results provided by this 
mathematical method.   
Given the emphasis  on a ‘specific technical  purpose’,  it  is  envisaged that  an 
invention that generates realist ic -sounding audio in a text -to-speech system could 
be eligible for protection. However, a more general  claim for generating arbitrary 
data sequences is  unlikely to fit  this category.  
(2)  Technical  implementation  
In contrast  with having a technical  output,  this category relates to the design  of the 
mathematical  method. To put i t  simply, if  the design of the mathematical  method is 
‘motivated by technical  considerations of the internal functioning of a 
computer’ 1 4 7 ,  this should render the invention eligible for protection. Here,  if  the 
mathematical method does not go beyond a generic technical  implementation, then 
it  will  not contribute to the technical  character of the invention. The EPGL also 
specify that  if  an algor ithm merely provides a more efficient mathematical method 
than what is  already known in the prior art,  this will  be insufficient.   
(3)  Teachings from the EPO 
Eligibil ity has not been totally excluded for AI algorithms under the EPC. Despite 
the language of the exclusions provided under article 52(2) and (3) EPC, algorithms 
can be considered as inventions if  the algorithm is not claimed as such  but 
represents a step in the functioning invention considered as a whole.  The new 
guidelines are clear insofar as AI and machine learning inventions should be treated 
as computer-related inventions under the EPC. Consequently, the exclusion of 
 
cu r ren t ly  p end ing  b efo re  t he  En larg ed  Bo ard  o f  App ea l .  Th e  cu rren t  Amicu s  Cur i ae  br i e f s  ( av ai l ab l e  on  
th e  EPO’s  web si t e )  seem to  f avo r  an  ap pl i cat io n  o f  T122 7/0 5  to  th ese  inv en t ions .  
1 4 6  Sup ra  n .  1 44 .  
1 4 7  Ib id ,  T13 58 /09 ,  sup ra  n .  145 .  
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mathematical methods will only be applicable i f the claims relate to abstract  
mathematical methods. The only way to save the program (or in our case an AI 
algorithm) from being excluded is to demonstrate that  the programming of AI 
contributes to an overall  further technical  character. 1 4 8  An example can be found in 
T1227/05,1 4 9  where a software relied on mathematical  formu la for simulating the 
noise of an electronic circuit .  Facil itat ing the design of electronic circuits by 
requiring less test  production, the mathematical idea achieved a technical effect 
and was eligible. Hence, provided that the computer supports the human  in 
achieving a technical effect ,  the invention has something technical  that  can be 
eligible.   Expanding the teaching of this case to an AI context,  an AI algorithm can 
be eligible for patentabil ity if  i t  produces a technical result  even where the AI 
replaces the human in the innovative process.  
Furthermore, where an AI or machine learning system serves a technical purpose, 
the steps of generating the training dataset,  and the training process of the AI or  
machine learning system,  1 5 0   may also contribute to the technical  character of the 
invention if those steps support  achieving the technical purpose. 1 5 1  This is  
significant as it  opens the door to patent protection for methodologies for training 
AI or AI algorithms. It has also the potential to enable the eligibil ity of methods 
for the creation of training datasets.  To be eligible, patent applicants  must 
convincingly explain how the method for creating the training dataset  consti tutes a 
stable and repeatable technical effect . 1 5 2  This probably includes having to 
determine specific features in the claims which enable the training method to 
produce a technical effect . Therefore, despite this broadening of subject -matter, in 
practice i t may well  be difficult for applicants to obtain a pate nt over subject -
matters such as the training process of an algorithm or the method to generate 
training datasets.  
 
1 4 8  Th i s  c r i t er io n  h as  b een  wide ly  c r i t i c i zed  as  a l so  r eco gnized  in  th e  Europ ean  Co mmission  Repo r t  2 00 8 .  
Eu rop ean  Co mmission ,  S tud y  on  th e  e f f ec t s  o f  a l lowin g  pa ten t  c la ims  for  co mp ute r - implemented  
in ven t ion s ,  f in a l  Rep o rt  a nd  Reco mmend at ion s  ( Jun e  200 8) ,  8 .   
1 4 9  Sup ra  n .  1 45 .  
1 5 0  EPGL Par t  G,  Ch ap .  I I -5 ,  3 .6 .3 .    
1 5 1  T1 175 /09  (2012 )  ECLI :EP :BA:20 12 :T1 1750 9.2 01 20206 .  Ho wev er ,  th e re  may  b e c l a r i ty  i s su es  i n  
wh ich  case ,  c lo se  a t t en t ion  shou ld  b e p a id  to  T20 26/15 ,  Train in g  meth od/PUCHER  (20 1 8)  
ECLI:EP :BA:2 018 :T2026 1 5.20 1841 7.  
1 5 2  So me see th is  a s  th e  in t rodu ct ion  o f  th e  con cep t  o f  ‘p l au sib i l i ty ’  t r ad i t ion a l ly  k no wn in  r e l a t io n  to  
ph armaceut i ca l s  an d  b io t ech  f i e ld s  in  th e  AI  f i e ld .  Sam Jon es ,  ‘Pa t en t ab i l i t y  o f  AI  and  machin e  l earn in g  
a t  th e  EPO’  (Dec  21 s t ,  20 18 )  Klu wer Pa ten t  B log  av a i l ab l e  a t  
h t tp : / / p at en tb lo g .k lu wer ip l aw.co m/2 018 /12 /21 /p a t en tab i l i t y -o f - a i - and -mach in e - l ea rn ing -a t - th e -ep o/   
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Going back to the traditional example of the self -driving car,  a novel algorithm may 
analyze inputs from various sensors o f the car to determine the quali ty of the 
surface of the road (e.g.  dry, wet,  ice) and adapt the driving accordingly ,  not only  
to improve the overall  performance of the car ,  but also to minimize possible car 
accidents.  This AI invention bears a technical  character as i t  rel ies on a technical 
device (i .e.  the car).  However,  taken in isolation, the algorithm itself is  treated as 
non-technical  despite the fact  that  i t  contributes to the overall  technicali ty of the 
self-driving car .   
A contrario ,  a patent claim that depicts a novel learning model to match offers to 
the demands of users by comparing information contained in offers,  demands and 
the information collected from users’ preferences  would lead to a different result .  
There is no denying that  in isolation, this AI algorithm is technical  and implemented 
by a computer.  Yet,  because of i ts  application, this invention clearly relates to a 
business model that  cannot be patented because its contribution to the prior art is 
not of a technical  nature.   
Overall ,  it  is  posit ive to see that  the EPO has taken steps towards recogni zing the 
eligibil ity of some contributions made by machine learning and algorithms for 
patentabili ty.  This being said,  it  has already been noted that  the judiciar y has been 
dealing with the technical merit  doctrine in an arbitrary fashion in relation to  
computer programs. 1 5 3  Similar issues are likely to arise with the eligibili ty AI 
algorithms and traces of such risks can already be found today. For example,  despite 
the fact that  the EPGL explicit ly refer to examples such as the classification of 
images, videos,  audio or speech signals based on low levels features as being 
technical  applications which are patentable,  the administrative posit ion of the EPO 
is to reject the findings of technical  character when dealing with the classification 
of text  documents based on their textual content. 1 5 4  Therefore,  if  there is  a poli tical  
decision to enable the pat entabili ty of AI,  the current si tuation (with untested new 
EPGL) could lead to a rather restrictive eligibil ity of AI.  
2.  Japan 
The Japanese Patent Act 1959 (JPA) defines an ‘invention’  in article 2(1) as ‘the 
highly advanced creation of technical  ideas util izing the laws of nature’. 1 5 5  The 
insertion of  ‘highly advanced’ merely refers to the dist inction between util i ty 
models and inventions.  However,  ‘technical  ideas’ is  interpreted in an objective 
manner,  meaning that  the invention is not the result  of hazard but can be 
 
1 5 3  H i l ty  and  Geig er ,  sup ra  n .  3 2 ,  626 .  
1 5 4  T1 358 /09 ,  su pra  n .  1 45 .  
1 5 5  Th i s  p rov i s ion  sho uld  b e  r ead  in  p a ra l l e l  wi th  a r t i c l e  29 (1 )  JPA.  
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repeated. 1 5 6  Furthermore, the ‘laws of nature ’  suggests acts result ing from pure 
mental activities should be excluded. 1 5 7  In contrast  with the other jurisdictions 
scrutinized, art icle 2(3)(i) adds that  a computer program is to be understood as a 
product for the purpose of the JPA. 1 5 8  To complete the picture,  article 2(4) defines 
computer programs as ‘a computer program (a set  of instructions given to an 
electronic computer which are combined in order to produce a specific result ,  
hereinafter the same shall  apply in this paragraph) and any other information that 
is  to be processed by an electronic computer equivalent to a computer  program’ .   
Similar to Europe and the US, the re is  a list  of ineligible subject -matters. 1 5 9  
However, this l ist  is  not statutory and can be found in the Examination Guidelines  
for Patent and Utili ty Model in Japan  (JPGL) Part  III,  chap. 1,  2.1.  For example, 
subject-matters that  do not util ize the laws of nature,  that  are not regarded as 
technical  ideas (i.e.  presentation of information and mere aesthetic creations),  that 
result in discoveries and those contrary to the laws of nature  will not result in an 
invention. 
According to the JPO’s practice,  the examination of eligibil i ty involves a two -step 
approach.1 6 0  First ,  the examiner establishes  whether the subject -matter triggers a 
‘creation of technical  idea uti lizing a law of nature’ 1 6 1  separate from the use of a 
computer program to achieve the solution. After all ,  under the JPA, a computer 
program is patentable as it  is  understood as inducing a machine to execute a method 
thereby creating a ‘technical  idea uti lizing a law of nature’. 1 6 2  The invention must 
be considered as a whole. 1 6 3  Therefore,  only a component of an invention may be 
 
1 5 6  Unl ik e  in  Eu rop e  wh ere  th i s  con cep t  en ables  th e  d i s t in c t ion  b etween  id eas  an d  th ei r  app l i ca t ion s .  
1 5 7  In  p rac t i ce ,  th ese  are  n o t  a s sessed  in  i so l a t ion .  see  Dragon i ,  sup r a  n .  1 29 ,  40 .  
1 5 8  But  th e  In s t i tu t e  o f  In t e l l ec tu a l  P ro p er ty  pu rpo r t s  t ha t  i f  th e  inv ent ion  con s i s t s  o f  a  l ea rn in g  metho d  
th an  i t  h as  to  b e  pro t ec t ed  as  a  method  to  produ ce  a  p ro du c t .  Th e  p rod u ct  b e ing  th e  r esu l t ing  l ea rn ed  
mo d el .  Th e e l ig ib i l i ty  o f  th e  l ear n ed  mod el  fo r  p at en t  p ro t ec t io n  h ing es  upo n  wh eth er  a  l ea rn ed  mod e l  
r esu l t s  in  a  p rodu c t  an d  co r respon d s to  a  ‘p rog ram’ in  th e  sen se  o f  th e  Ac t .  Jap an ese  Ins t i tu t e  o f  
In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty ,  Fou nd at ion  for  In t e l l ectu al  P rop er ty ,  su pra  n .  4 1 ,  31 .  Howev er ,  do ub t s  as  t o  th i s  
ap pro ach  a re  exp ressed  in  Sak ai ,  sup ra  n .  63 ,  24 0 -24 1 .  
1 5 9  JPGL,  Par t  I I I ,  ch ap .  1 ,  2 .1 ;  Ex amin at io n  Han dbook  for  Pa t en t  and  Ut i l i ty  Mod e l  in  Jap an  
(Ex amin at ion  Handb ook )  Ann ex  B ,  Ch ap .  1 .  
1 6 0  Ex amin a t ion  Guid el in es  o n  Co mpu te r  So f tware - re l a t ed  Inv en t ion s ,  20 .  
1 6 1  In  acco rd an ce wi th  JPGL,  Par t  I I I ,  Ch .  1 .   
1 6 2  Ho wev er ,  t h e  su b jec t -mat t er  wi l l  no t  r esu l t  i n  a  p a t en tab le  in v ent io n  i f  i t  f a l l s  und er  JPGL,  Par t  I I I ,  
ch ap .  1 ,  2 .1 .  
1 6 3  Tokyo  High  cou r t  Judg men t ,  Decemb er  25 t h ,  19 56 ,  Gy ō shū ,  vo l .7  no  12 ,  31 5 7 and  esp eci a l ly ,  
In t e l l ectu al  P ro p er ty  Hig h  Cou r t ,  F i r s t  d iv i s io n ,  Jun e  24 t h ,  2008 ,  2007  (Gyo -Ke)  1036 9 .  
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util izing the laws of nature  and st il l  be eligible .  If  the patent examiner cannot 
determine whether the invention util i zes the laws of nature ,  the examiner moves 
onto the second step , which involves determining whether the subject -matter is 
eligible for protection from the standpoint of software. Concretel y, this means that 
the examiner will check whether the information processed by the software is in 
reali ty relying upon the use of hardware  and how  the software interacts with the 
hardware.1 6 4   
Given the absence of statutory language excluding software from  patentabil ity,  
Japan is in better posit ion to tackle the protection of AI inventions.  Already in 
2004, the Tokyo High Court  explicit ly notes that  algorithms c an be eligible for 
patentabili ty as long as natural  laws are util ized, meaning that  the claims must 
explain the relationship between the algorithm and the physical  parts of the 
invention, and this relationship  must result  from a concrete interaction. 1 6 5  Here,  
simply stating that  the mathematical  formula must be executed by a computer will  
be insufficient.  What is  important is to explain the specific interaction between the 
hardware and the software. 1 6 6  In a recent document from the JPO providing 
examples pertinent to IoT technology, the JPO confirms that  inventions equivalent 
to a computer program can be eligible for protection. Therefore,  data structure that  
consti tutes information that  needs to be processed by computers can be 
patentable. 1 6 7  It  is not essential  for the information to directly instruct  a computer  
and i t  is  sufficient that  the invention shares similar properties to a computer 
program.1 6 8  
3.  US 
The US patent system rest s on the idea that  ‘[w]hoever  invents or discovers any 
new and useful process,  machine, manufacture, or composit ion of matter,  or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,  subject  to the 
 
1 6 4  Wh ich  app l i can t s  a re  en courag ed  to  p rov id e  in  t h e  c l a ims .   
1 6 5  Tokyo  High  Co ur t ,  Decemb er  21 s t ,  20 04 ,  20 04  (Gyo -Ke)  188 ,  Han j i  18 91 ,  1 39 .  Ho wev er ,  i f  t h e  
inv en t ion  co n si s t s  o f  a  math emat i ca l  method  to  r eso lv e merely  a  math emat i ca l  p ro b lem,  th en  i t  w i l l  no t  
be  e l ig ib l e .  In t e l l ec tu a l  P rop er ty  High  Cou r t ,  Febru ary  2 9 t h  2008 ,  Han j i ,  No .  2 012 ,  p .  97 ,  200 7  (Gyo -Ke)  
10239 .  
1 6 6  Ib id .  
1 6 7  See  case  2 -13 :  d at a  s t ru c tu r e  o f  d i a logu e  scen ar io s  i n  v o ice  in t erac t iv e  sy st ems  found  in  t h e  JPO’ s  
case ex amp les  p er t i n en t  to  AI -Re la t ed  t ech nology  av ai l ab l e  a t  
h t tp s : / /www.jp o .go . jp / e / sys t em/ l aws / ru l e /gu id e l in e/pa t en t /h andb ook_ shin sa /d ocu men t / ind ex/ap p_ z_ a i -
j i r e i_ e .pd f  wh ich  can  b e cont ras t e d  to  th e  r ev ised  examin a t ion  h and book  app endix  B ch apte r  1 ,  2 .1 .2 .  
1 6 8  A l so  con f i rmed in  do cu men t  Ex amin a t ion  Gu id e l in es  on  Co mpu ter  Sof tware - re l a t ed  Inv en t ion s ,  1 -2 .  
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conditions and requirements of this t it le’ 1 6 9 .   Prior to this statutory  provision, the 
judiciary had already established that laws of nature,  abstract ideas and natural  
phenomena could not be patented. 1 7 0  Against  this backdrop, the USPTO and courts 
determine what are the eligible subject -matters for patent protection. 1 7 1  This led 
courts to note that  the very nature of a computer program results into patenting an 
abstract  idea and therefore,  was initially not allowed. 1 7 2  Similarly,  courts have 
expanded the categories of ineligible subject -matters to mathematical  algorithms 
and business methods for similar  reasons.1 7 3   
The inabili ty to patent mathematical formula was noted in Benson1 7 4  in relation to 
a converter capable of transforming decimal numbers into binary numbers .  Here, 
the Supreme Court  defined an algorithm as ‘a procedure for solving a given type of  
mathematical  problem’ 1 7 5 .  In so doing, the Court conflated algorithms with ways to 
convert  one form of numerical  representation to another which could be done 
through mental  process with the help of tables –  holding that  the application of a 
mathematical  formula derives from its connection to a computer .  If  the algorithm 
is claimed independently from any hardware, i t  shall be ineligible . If  one allowed 
the patentabil ity of computer programs this would be tantamount to patenting the 
underlying algorithm which the Court  considered as resulting in the patenting of an 
abstract  idea. 1 7 6  This led to a series of discussion s before the courts as to whether  
the subject -matter resulted merely from a purely mental activity which is not  
 
1 6 9  35  USC § 101 .  
1 7 0  Cha krab a rt y ,  su pra  n .  3 6 ;  r ep ea t ed  in  Ma yo ,  su pra  n .  30  and  Al i ce  Co rp  P ty  L td  v  CLS Ba n k  
In t erna t io na l  ( (201 4)  13 4  S .  C t .  23 47 )  ( Al i ce )  cases  mo re  r ecen t ly .   
1 7 1  See a l so  2 019  Rev ised  Paten t  Sub ject -M at t er  El ig ib i l i t y  Gu id an ce  wh ich  in c lud es  th a t  j ud ici a l  
ex c lu s ion s  cov er :  ab st r ac t  i d eas  su ch  as  math emat i cal  con cep t s ,  men tal  p ro cess ,  cer t a in  metho d s o f  
o rg aniz ing  hu man ac t iv i ty  as  we l l  a s  l aws o f  n a tu re  and  n a tu ral  ph eno men a ;  Co ng ress io n al  Research  
Serv i ces ,  su pra  n .  3 0 .  
1 7 2  U tk u  and  S t ro wel ,  sup ra  n .  74 ,  489 -5 10;  Thi s  sec t io n  i s  no t  ex h au s t iv e .  Fo r  a  co mp let e  and  mo r e  
de t a i l ed  an a ly s i s ,  s ee  Con  Díaz ,  su pra  n .  8 2 ,  139 -1 6 0 .  
1 7 3  Sta t e  S t ree t  Ba n k  an d  Tr us t  Co  v  s igna tu re  F in an c ia l  Group  ( sup ra  n .  126 )  I f  i t  p rod u ces  a  t ang ib l e  
an d  p rac t i ca l  u t i l i ty ,  i t  may  b e  e l ig ib l e  fo r  p a t en tab i l i ty .  
1 7 4  Sup ra ,  n.  30 .  
1 7 5  Ib id .  Thi s  d e f in i t ion  i s  c r i t i c i zed  for  b e in g  ov er ly  i nc lu s iv e  ( as  no t  a l l  a lg or i thms  so lv e  math emat i ca l  
p rob lems)  an d  r a th er  unh e lpfu l  (b ecau se  th e re  i s  no  d ef in i t i on  as  to  wh at  a  math emat i ca l  p ro b lem con s i s t s  
o f )  s imu l t an eou s ly .  Min sk ,  sup ra  n .  17 ,  258 .   
1 7 6  Sup ra ,  n .  30 ,  a t  7 1 .  
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patentable or if there is something more, in which case, this provides clues for 
patent el igibili ty.  1 7 7    
Let’s take the  example of the  Christensen  decision in relation to a method for 
determining subsurface porosity through a particular mathematical  formula. 1 7 8  
Although the Court tried to l imit  the teachings of the Benson decision by restrict ing 
the decision to its  facts,  i .e.  to claims directed to a  machine whilst  rendering 
programs ineligible ,  it  was st il l  constrained by i ts  decision , and eventually ,  rejected 
the eligibili ty of the claims . Later cases nevertheless adopted a closer reading of 
Benson and rendered both machine and process claims inelig ible.  From the Flook  
decision,  1 7 9  the Court  rejected the eligibili ty of a method for updating alarm limits 
during catalytic conversion of hydrocarbon through the use of a computer program 
because the only novel element subsisted in the mathematical  formula.  
Starting with Diehr ,1 8 0  the Supreme Court  recognized the possibil ity to patent a law 
of nature or mathematical  formula provided that  they have a concrete application. 1 8 1  
It  thereby limited the exclusion of computer programs from patentabili ty to those 
patent applications which , as a whole,  described a mathematical  formula  in 
abstracto .   
AI programs are assessed as other computer -implemented inventions under US law. 
If some argue that  there is  no current urge to change patent eligibil ity to 
accommodate AI inventions,  in the ninet ies,  there were nevertheless uncertainties 
as to how some AI innovation might be  protected. 1 8 2  For example,  if  the AI 
invention merely consist ed of mathematical  methods or algorithms without having 
any accompanying specific application s,  these may be ineligible as constituting an 
abstract  idea only. 1 8 3  
Some thirty years later,  the Supreme Court  addressed the scope of the law of nature 
exception in Mayo . 1 8 4  Dealing with a method to give treatment to a patient by 
measuring metaboli tes in human blood to then calibrate the appropriate drug 
 
1 7 7  Min sk  c r i t i c i zes  th e  r easo ning  of  th e  Co ur t  i n  Ben so n  fo r  go in g  way  b ey ond  wh a t  was  n eed ed  to  d ecid e  
th e  case  and  th e re fo re  h as  de t r imenta l  e f f ec t s  on  th e  dev elo p men t  o f  in nov a t ion .  Min sk ,  sup ra  n .  17 ,  258 ;  
L.  R .  Tu rk ev ich ,  ‘An  end  to  th e  “Math emat i ca l  Alg o r i th m” Con fu s ion ’  (1 995 )  17(2 )  EIPR ,  9 1 -98 .  
1 7 8  Ap pl i ca t io n  o f  Ch ri s t en sen  ( 197 3)  478  F .2d  13 92  (C .C .P .A. ) .  
1 7 9  Pa rker  v  Floo k  ( 1978 )  43 7  U.S .  584  (F look ) .  
1 8 0  Sup ra  n .  1 24 .  
1 8 1  Ver t in sky  and  R ice ,  su pra  n .  53 ,  592 .  
1 8 2  AIPPI ,  sup ra  n .  42 ,  6 .  
1 8 3  See  AT&T v Excel  Co mmunica t ion s  (1999 )  In c .  172  F .3d  1352  (Fed .  C i r . ) .  
1 8 4  Ma yo ,  su pra  n .  30 .  
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dosage ,  the Court  denied patent el igibil ity because the claims represented ‘l it tle 
more than an instruction to doctors to a pply the applicable laws when treating their  
patients’1 8 5  and thereby lacked any inventive concept.    
Against  this backdrop, t he 2014 Supreme Court decision in Alice v CLS Bank 1 8 6  has 
changed the rules of patent el igibili ty in the US. 1 8 7  The facts relate to the patenting 
of a platform used to drive financial transactions to mitigate settlement risk. As 
held,  the first  step is  to determine whether the claim is seeking patentabili ty o f an 
ineligible subject -matter such as an abstract  idea ,  laws of nature or natural  
phenomena. If not,  the invention is deemed patentable.  In the affirmative,  the 
second step seeks to determine whether the subject -matter nevertheless includes an 
‘inventive  concept’ ,  t ransforming an ineligible subject -matter into an eligible 
concept  which occurs if the claims result  in something ‘signif icantly more’ than a 
patent on an ineligible concept in practice .1 8 8  Hence, a claim recit ing an algorithm 
which can be implemented by a normal computer will  often be ineligible.  
Whilst  the Alice  and Mayo  frameworks have cast  doubt on the eligibil ity of business 
methods and software patents,  subsequent  decisions from the Federal  Circuit  have 
tried to soften the impact of Alice .1 8 9  The Enfish  case can be considered as i t  relates 
to data structure (a self-referential  database allowing for faster search and more 
effective storage in this case) . Here,  because the court  was satisfied that  the claims 
went beyond the attempt of patenting  an abstract  idea to patent a specific way of  
improving the performance of computers in dealing with self -referential  databases ,  
it  was found eligible for patentabil ity. To determine whether a patent application 
tries to patent an abstract idea,  the court  held that previous court decisions in  
relation to the patenting of an abstract  ideas must be consulted. Subsequently,  the 
subject-matter needs to be assessed as a whole to determine whether the claims 
attempt to patent an ineligible subject -matter.  Hence, the Federal  Circuit  in Enfish  
recognizes that  the patenting of algorithms is not inherently abstract  and that  some 
improvements made in computational -related technology notwithstanding hardware 
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impact can be non-abstract . 1 9 0  Such cases give an impression that  the Federal  
C ircuit’s interpretation took a l iberal  posit ion towards subject-eligibil ity. 1 9 1  
More recently in Thales Visionix,  Inc.  v United States ,1 9 2  a US Court of Appeal 
found eligible the technique for posit ioning sensors in a particular configuration 
and using the raw data from these to more efficiently and accurately cal culate the 
posit ion and orientation of an object on a moving platform. Given the draftsmanship 
of claims that focused more on the novel configuration of the sensors than on the 
new mathematical equations used to make the calculations, the concept was held as 
eligible for patentabil ity.  
Despite the optimism shared by these decisions, 1 9 3  other cases with implications 
for AI patents might be less favorable.  In Digitech Image Technologies v Electronic 
Imaging , 1 9 4  the facts relate to ‘the generation and use of an "improved device 
profile" that  describes spatial  and color properties of a device within a digital  image 
processing system’1 9 5 .  According to the description of the problem, all prior devices 
include some form of distortion in spatial  and color properties.  Whilst  the case does 
not deal  with AI inventions ,  i t  does contain statements such as  ‘ [t]he method in 
the '415 patent claims an abstract  idea because i t  describes a process of organizing 
information through mathematical correlations and is not tied to a specific structure 
or machine’ , 1 9 6  which are problematic for the protection of AI inventions.   
Similarly, in Electric Power group, LLC v Alstom SA 1 9 7 ,  the court  dealt  with the 
reception of real -t ime data originating from occurrences in a wide geographical 
area and automatically analyzing these occurrences on an interconnected electric 
power grid.  Given the intangibili ty of the claims, the Federal Circuit  found that  the 
claims centered around data collection, gathering , analyzes and displaying results  
which consti tute ‘a combination of those abstract  ideas ’ .  There was no inventive 
technology, result ing in an ineligible subject -matter.  The court  distinguished the 
facts from those in the Enfish  case,  as in the latter,  the claim focused on a specific 
improvement in how computers could carry out some of the basic  functions of 
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storage and retrieval of data retrieval of  data whereas Alstom  saw no attempts to 
improve hardware ,  which prevented the claims to be eligible for patentabili ty.  This 
is  an extremely broad decision which had an impact on the patentabili ty of software -
related inventions  but it  must be noted that i t  does not related to AI applications .  
Nevertheless,  the USPTO recognizes  the patentabil ity of AI through class 706 of 
MPEPand has established dedicated teams to review the prior art  directed toward 
AI algorithms. 1 9 8  Turning to learned models, Gokhale argues that the current state 
of the law in the US does not render patentable learned models consist ing of an AI 
program and its parameters. 1 9 9  The learned model will not be eligible for protection 
unless it  is  recorded in a ‘recording medium’. 2 0 0  The difficulty is  that  currently a 
key aspect of machine learning relates to the noise associated with any dataset and 
the suitabil ity of a part icular algorithm in relation to a specific model.  This is  
removed from the recording medium and yet ,  innovation in this area such as ways 
to facil itate the training process would be deemed as innovative by experts in the 
field.  A risk is  that  these AI algorithms include more generic mathematical  methods 
(which are directed to an abstract  idea) and that  by rendering these eligible , a 
subtraction of information in the public domain is condoned.  Doubts can also be 
derived from the Alstom  decision, as with a certain level of abstraction many of 
these models can be boiled down to ‘collection, gathering, analyzing data and 
displaying results’ which are ineligible.  The difference with Alstom  nevertheless  
lies in the processing phase which relat es to a human created framework involving 
algorithms which may evolve overtime.  This is  arguably substantially more than 
simply collecting, analyzing and displaying results  or equating a mental  process.  
Despite the uncertainties,  some guidance can be found in the 2019 Revised Patent 
Subject-Matter Eligibil ity Guidance (USPTO Guidance) . Recognizing the 
difficulties in applying the Alice/Mayo  test  in a consistent manner,  the USPTO 
decided to revise i ts  procedure on eligibil ity. According to the new rules, a two -
step test  is  applied. First ly,  an assessment of the claim must determine whether i t  
involves a judicial  subject -matter exclusion.  Here,  the USPTO Guidance clarif ies 
the meaning of ‘abstract ideas’.  In stead of requiring examiners to compare claims 
to judicial  precedents,  the USPTO Guidance offers a summary of the case law and 
established three categories of abstract ideas:  mathematical concepts,  certain 
methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. 2 0 1  Notwithstanding 
exceptional circumstances,  subject -matters that  do not fall  under these headings 
 
1 9 8  DeCo s ta  and  Car rano ,  su pra  n .  10 1 .   
1 9 9  Gokh a le ,  sup ra  n .  97 ,  47 -48 .  
2 0 0  DeCo s ta  and  Car rano ,  su pra  n .  10 1 .  
2 0 1  USPTO Gu id an ce a t  52 .  
42 
 
should not be treated as an abstract  idea. 2 0 2  Guidance is also provided in relation 
to the meaning of a patent claim ‘directed to’ an ineligible category. T he patent 
examiner must determine if the subject -matter exclusion is integrated into a 
‘practical  application  of the exception’ 2 0 3 .  If  it  is  not embedded into an application, 
then the second step is triggered. Here,  further analysis  will be necessary as per the 
Alice/Mayo  test to establish whether the elements of the subject -matter provide an 
inventive concept .  Provided that  the answer is  positive,  the claim will  be eligible 
for patentabil ity. Early comments of these changes have been mixed. Some 
commentators welcome the new USPTO Guidance for providing more clarity and 
lowering the threshold for triggering ineligibil ity under section 101 but others 
crit icize these changes for being inconsistent with the  recent jurisprudence from 
the Supreme Court . 2 0 4   
In relation to the eligibil ity of AI programs, the USPTO Guidance provides some 
insights in example 39. 2 0 5  The case scenario relates to a neural  network train ed to 
classify images based upon the presence of a human face or not for the purposes of 
facial detection in images . Because the claims rely on hardware and are not written 
in a way to claim a mathematical  method, business method or a mental  process,  the 
USPTO notes that  the claim is el igible for protection.  
4.  Comparison 
One of the inherent difficulties with patenting AI algorithms derives from the fact  
that  most  attempt to replicate human ingenuity and therefore,  are more susceptible 
to be found ineligible for patentabili ty.  This comparative exercise t eaches us that  
all  three jurisdictions assess AI inventions just as computer programs. This being 
said,  differences remain from the standpoint of the statutory framework and 
practices.   
It  is  noteworthy that  Japan is the only jurisdiction defining invention positively.  
Contrastingly,  Europe and the US only define invention negatively ,  ei ther through 
statutory provisions or precedents.  Focusing on the Japanese definit ion of 
invention, it  is  unique insofar as this is  the only jurisdiction requiring both the 
involvement of a ‘technical  idea’ and the util ization of the laws of nature.  We also 
find the concept of technical  idea in Europe and the US, though this is  a relatively 
recent concept (especially in the lat ter case) .  Despite the explicit  reference to the 
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laws of nature,  this is not alien to the other jurisdictions under scrutiny and appears 
to be a way for rejecting the eligibili ty of abstract  ideas under the JPA. 2 0 6   
As confirmed by the interviews conducted in Japan with patent attorneys ,  academics  
and officials from the JPO, the eligibil i ty of AI algorithms is easy to satisfy in 
practice provided that care has been given to claim drafting. The claims in patent 
applications must explain the involvement of hardware ,  especially, how the 
software or AI algorithm interacts with the hardware.  It  appears especially easy in 
Japan to connect the invention to the use of the laws of nature and thus,  qualify as 
an invention, as opposed to the practice in other jurisdictions.  For example,  in 
Europe, the over-focus on the technical  features (and the further technical 
character) requires a  higher level of examination and generally raises the bar of 
eligibil ity for computer -implemented inventions.  Likewise,  in the US, the test has 
become substantially harder to pass  since the Alice-Mayo-Alstom  decisions,  leaving 
the applicants in doubt as to the outcome of their patent applications. These 
decisions appear to bring the US closer to i ts  European counterpart by requiring an 
element of tangibili ty close to what is curren tly applied under the EPC and the 
technical merit  doctrine.  Though, the European technical merit  doctrine has been 
widely cri ticized (and sti ll  is) ,  at  least there now exists a body of case law to help 
patent applicants as to its  meaning.  
Beyond that ,  rely ing on hardware and tangibili ty of the invention might lead to 
problems in the future regarding the eligibil ity of subject -matters. Since the 50’s,  
computer programs have progressively dematerialized and do not rely on machines 
(i.e.  hardware) to perform a  technical  function. If draftsmanship currently enables  
the satisfaction of this requirement,  i t  may not be reflecting the true nature of the 
invention and is likely to create problems in the future,  limiting the eligibili ty of 
AI innovation. The same is t rue regarding algorithms. If the init ial  justification for 
their exclusion from patentabil ity was that  these merely consist  of mathematical  
formula waiting to be discovered in nature or equal to an abstract  idea,  this is  not 
the case today. AI algorithms r esult  from human ingenuity with some elements 
autonomously adjusted by the algorithm itself  (in the case of a strong AI which 
calibrates parameters on i ts  own without human intervention) .  The best  way forward 
may be to remove the blanket exclusion of eligi bili ty of algorithms, or reduce i t to 
algorithms that  can be done by hand  and consider this on a case -by-case basis by 
determining whether the subject -matter presents technicali ty (understood more 
broadly as currently conceived in Europe to cover social and economic uti l ity of  
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the invention). 2 0 7  Furthermore, patentabili ty requir ements will ensure that  only 
valuable algorithms receive protection.  
We can see the difficulties in patenting AI innovation in how the different 
jurisdictions would protect  neural  networks .  Some guidance can be extrapolated 
from one of the case studies provided in a recent co-authored report  by the EPO 
and JPO.2 0 8  The invention consists of a trained model to instruct a computer to 
attribute quantified values for the reputations of accommodation based on text data 
of the reputation of said accommodations.  To  function, the trained model operates 
by relying on two neural  networks,  which causes the computer to perform 
calculations based on the frequency of certain keywords obtained from text data 
about the reputation of establishments.  Taking into consideration the prior art,  a 
claim for the invention described here above leads to different outcomes in Europe 
and in Japan. For the EPO, a trained neural network causing a computer to perform 
calculations is of an abstract nature without any specific instructions that  needs to 
be carried out by a computer. 2 0 9  Therefore,  such subject -matter falls  outside the 
scope of 52(2) and (3) EPC (and following Alice ,  this is would also be the outcome 
reached in the US).  Additionally,  the EPO is not convinced that such subject -matter 
would include a further technical matter going beyond the normal interaction 
between the program and the computer on which it  is  run, especially as the problem 
solved appears to be of commercial  nature (ranking accommodations’ reputations).  
The situation may be different if the claim covered a technical problem instead of 
a commercial  one and, depending on the disclosure and draftsmanship of the claims, 
the subject -matter may be eligible for patentabili ty. If  the claim focuses more on 
the structure and function of the neural  networks as well  as i ts  ranking process ,  
which contributes to the overall  technical  process,  than the invention may be 
covered by art .  52(2) and (3) EPC.  
Contrastingly,  Japan more easily considers a trained model as an  invention. This 
can be explained by the fact  that  the claim , as described, not only effective ly 
outlines a program despite referring to ‘model’ ,  but this model relies on software 
and hardware to function. Consequently,  the subject -matter results in the creation 
of a technical  idea util izing a law of nature and results into an invention as per the 
JPA.2 1 0  It  must be noted that  i t  is  necessary to explain the relationship between 
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software and hardware to be eligible for protection. 2 1 1  This liberal  view even 
enables business-related inventions to be patented in Japan (in the financial sector).  
This is  not possible in other jurisdictions.   
Furthermore, the way in which eligibil ity is  assessed varies in different countries.  
In Europe and US there is  a certain complexity linked to the dissection of technical 
and non-technical  features.  If  non-technical  features are ignored in the assessment 
of el igibil ity in Europe and the US, this is  not the case in Japan  where the invention 
is assessed as a whole.  Given the nature of the information society and the rise of 
intangible innovation, the Japanese solution seems to be favorable to AI innovation 
where technical  and non-technical  aspects are integrated and generally inseparable.  
There are nevertheless l imitations to this AI  friendly approach adopted in Japan. A 
learned model embedding a technical idea and uti li zing the laws of nature will only 
be eligible if  it  is  understood as an AI program and i ts  parameters (the weighting 
coefficients discussed in section 3 of this report ).  However,  if  the inventor is 
attempting to get  a patent over the parameters alone, 2 1 2  this is  akin to trying to 
patent data ,  which falls  outside the scope of computer programs (and is protected 
by specific legislation since last  year ).  As recognized by the Japanese Committee 
to Review Intellectual  Property Regarding Data -Related Assets,  if  these models are 
eligible for protection, i t  is  necessary to hold discussion on the application of 
patentabili ty requirements to this technological innov ation and determine the scope 
of protection to be granted. 2 1 3   
Doubts as to the types of learned models that  are eligible for patentabil ity have 
emerged. For example,  Sakai explains that  despite the optimism of the JPO, areas 
of uncertainties remain. By announcing that  learned models can be patentable as 
they are akin to programs, there is  a risk that  patent attorneys use ‘learned models’ 
as terminology to ensure eligibil ity when in reality,  the invention relates to 
algorithms. Whilst the difference might no t be straightforward, Sakai provides us 
with an il lustration  by considering a US patent application in relation to the 
independent learning by the layers of a  neural network on their own ( i .e.  batch 
normalization).  This is  an essential  step in deep learnin g where a trained algorithm 
needs to adapt to perform in a new setting. A common example leads us back to an 
algorithm trained to recognize cats in images,  but where the original  network was 
only fed with images of white cats.  If  suddenly we apply the AI m odel to images of 
colored cats,  the model will  not perform well .  By using batch normalization, there 
is  an improvement of the performance of  the neural  network by adding parameters 
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that adjust and scale each layer . In this case, there are doubts as to whet her we are 
dealing with an ‘invention of a process to produce a product’. 2 1 4  Beyond 
appearances,  the subject -matter might actually be datasets -  bringing the need to 
better understand the learned model as a program and a learned model that  might 
refer to datasets.  Moreover, there are some crit icisms of applying well -established 
patent paradigm concepts to this very type of innovation. Let’s not fo rget  that  the 
Japanese Supreme Court  has held that  product -by-process claims in fields such as 
biotechnology or chemistry refer to ‘products that  can exist  in the natural  world 
under the rules of a principle of nature  (regardless of whether i t  has actually  existed 
in the natural  world)’ 2 1 5  which explains how such claims util i ze the laws of 
nature.2 1 6  However,  in theory there is  potentially no limitation to the structure of a 
learned model (AI program and i ts  parameters) , bringing into question how some 
subject-matters might be uti lizing the laws of nature and fit  the definit ion of 
‘invention’ under the JPA. Based on the case studies from the JPA (l ink to the 
reputation of accommodations example),  i t  is only whe n the claims and descriptions 
explain the relationship between the software and hardware that  the learned model 
will qualify as an invention. However,  patent examiners must be vigilant as some 
applicants might be using ‘learned models’ to actually get  a patent over algorithms 
or parameters that  should be considered to be data or data structure.   
Difficult ies are also present in the US. In addit ion to the confusion following the 
Alice-Mayo-Alstom  decisions, there may be disclosure implications rendering the 
eligibil ity of learning models close to impossible.  It  is  expected that  patent 
attorneys will  need to ensure the disclosure of the start ing design, layout and 
structure of the neural network pr ior to any training being done accompanied with 
the training data and protocols. Whilst these difficulties may be overcome if the 
invention relies on commercially available AI programs, (in which case,  patent 
attorneys can simply make a reference to  these ),  it  seems to be counterintuitive to 
render eligible AI algorithms based on already available programs instead of 
rewarding patentees for coming up with new AI algorithms. Yet,  Jin argues that  this 
narrowly defined patent right is  to be welcomed as it  shou ld encourage industry 
collaboration and promote innovation through data reuse. 2 1 7  
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VI. The second hurdle: challenges in applying the novelty 
requirement 
When attempting to patent AI,  the two first hurdles will relate to eligibil ity and 
issues of prior art  under the novelty requirement.  Although this is not to say that  
there is  no impact on the inventive step requirement,  this issue has already attracted 
a lot  of attention whilst discussions around novelty are only nascent. Generally 
speaking, an invention will  be considered new if i t  does not form part  of the prior 
art.  Consequently,  the invention should not have been made available to the public 
in some form.2 1 8  As explained in section 2, the underlying goal is  to avoid that  
products and processes already in the public domain suddenly become privately 
owned again.  It  also ensures that two l imited monopolies are not granted over the 
same invention. This explains why i t is not possible to combine pieces of the prior 
art  for the purpose of novelty.  What patent examiners will  ascertain  is  whether the 
subject-matter makes a technical  contribution to the prior art  sufficiently different 
from what was already known up to the fil ing or priori ty date.  However,  the above 
relies on the premise that the entire prior art is known at  a specific moment in t ime, 
which in reali ty,  is  hard to establish in this field .  
If  the novelty requirement has not created many problems by the past ,  there are 
possible difficult ies lying ahead for the patentabil ity of AI algorithms.  First ly,  the 
satisfaction of the novelty requirement for AI algorithms is contingent upon the 
technical  contribution made to the prior art.  As mentioned in the preceding section, 
algorithms can be excluded from protection for being abstract  ideas o r non-
technical.  Provided that this hurdle is overcome, novelty generally cannot derive 
from non-technical  elements such as a more efficient mathematical method. The 
contribution must be of a technical  nature.  The problem is that  taken in isolation, 
the features of an invention might be non -technical  but when considered as a whole,  
these non-technical  features may well  contribute to the overall  technical  nature of 
the invention.  
A classic example can be found in noise reduction algorithms in images.  The 
algorithm used to analyze a signal for noise reduction may be non -technical .  
However,  i t  contributes to the overall  technical  character of the invention by 
allowing the reduction of noise in a particular image. The same can be said about 
an algorithm capable of turning text conte nt into speech. This is  because the input 
and output quantity differ ,  exemplifying the presence of a technical contribution. 
Secondly, the novelty of AI algorithms inherently depends on the inventive process 
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itself as novelty may be lacking if the algorith m used is already commercially 
available.  The satisfaction of novelty for AI algorithms also require versatil i ty in 
its reported results (outputs)  or datasets.  Therefore,  the more randomness and 
versatil ity is  present in the algorithm, the more likely i t  w ill  generate novel 
inventions. 2 1 9   Yet,  the harder it  is  to satisfy the sufficiency of disclosure 
requirement.  
1.  Europe 
According to article 54 (1) and (2) EPC, ‘[a] n invention shall  be considered to be 
new if it  does not form part  of the state of the art.  The state of the art  shall  be held 
to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral 
description, by use,  or in any other way, before the date of fi ling of the European 
patent application.’ This is a very broad definit i on, as anything made available in 
any language and anywhere in the world will  form part  of the prior art . 2 2 0  Novelty 
will  be defeated where the skil led person in the art  has sufficient information  using 
the common general  knowledge in the field at  the prior ity date to perform the 
subject of the disclosure. 2 2 1  This is referred to as an ‘enabling disclosure’ ,  meaning 
that  not only all  the information belong ing to the subject -matter must  be found in 
the prior art ,  but there should be also a disclosure of the process of how to replicate 
the subject-matter of the application.  
Unsurprisingly,  the initial  step is to define what forms part  of the state of the art . 
We already commented on the width of this concept.  Bar the exclusion of 
information obtained in breach of a confidentiality agreement;  specific rules apply 
to the examination of patent application s not yet published by the EPO at the t ime 
of fi ling. Indeed, as prescribed by article 54(3) EPC, secret  prior art  o riginating 
from the patent applicant and third parties must be included in the prior art .2 2 2  This  
ensures that  there is  no double -patenting of the same subject -matter and patents are 
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not granted over minor improvements or differences in relation to a similar subject -
matter.2 2 3    
But this concept is  also broad due to the fact  that  the prior art  is  not limited to what 
has been explicit ly disclosed in the past,  and includes  also implicit  disclosures as 
interpreted by the person skil led in the art. 2 2 4  Once the relevant prior art has been 
identified and i ts  content absorbed, the next step consists  of comparing the claimed 
invention to the prior art as defined to determine whether novelty is  present.  This 
will be the case if the claimed invention departs from the prior art  as defined by 
the applicant . However, if the subject -matter is clearly and di rectly inferable from 
the prior art ,  then novelty will be destroyed. 2 2 5  Here,  a presumption is made that  
the person skil led in the art  would consider these inferred elements as being 
disclosed.  
If  defined as algorithms and parameters,  AI programs can inclu de features that  can 
be considered as automatically present if  the teaching of the prior art is exercised.  
Not only can the patent examiner derive parameters from the prior art but if  a 
specific disclosure of these parameters is  made, this has the conseque nce of 
destroying novelty of a  future generic feature in the claim. 2 2 6  In other words,  the 
specific disclosure of parameters will  destroy the novelty in a range including the 
same value. However, the opposite does not hold true and a generic disclosure will  
not  destroy the novelty in specific claims. 2 2 7  
To sum up, the EPO adopts a strict  approach to novelty.  In a recent report  co -
authored by the EPO and the JPO, an example of how novelty should be examined 
in relation to AI inventions  is  analyzed.2 2 8  The subject -matter relates to a ‘robot 
apparatus’ comprised of two claims. The first  claim relates to the ‘communication, 
via transmission section and a reception section, with a server’. The server,  the 
 
2 2 3  Ex t reme ca re  i s  th e re fo re  advi sab le .  See d ramat i c  consequ en ces  in  T1496 /11 ,  S el f - ver i f y ing  secu r i t y  
do cu men t s  (20 12 )  ECLI:EP:BA:2012 :T149 611 .201 2 0912 .  
2 2 4  T6 77/91  M a ss se l ect i ve  e j ect ion /FINNIGAN  (19 92 )  ECLI:EP :BA:1 992 :T067 791.1992 1103 ;  T46 5/9 2  
Alu minu m al loy s  (1994 )  ECLI :EP:BA:199 4:T04 6592 .199 4101 4.   
2 2 5  T46 5/9 2 ,  su p ra  n .  223 ;  T5 11/92  (199 3)  ECLI :EP:BA:199 3:T051 192 .19 93052 7;  T6/80  (198 1 )  
ECLI:EP :BA:1 981 :T0006 8 0.19 8105 13;  T71 /93  (1993 )  ECLI:EP :BA:19 93 :T007 193.1993 0601 .  
2 2 6  Th i s  i s  d e r iv ed  f ro m es t ab l i sh ed  case  l aw f ro m th e  Bo ard s  o f  App ea l .  See  T6 51/91  (199 3 )  
ECLI:EP :BA:1 993 :T0651 9 1.19 9302 18;  T6 /04  NMR imag ing  wi th  s imu la t io n  of  th e  pu l se  sequ en ce  (2 006 )   
ECLI:EP :BA:2 006 :T0006 0 4.20 0607 21;  T117 4/0 5  Disp la cemen t  memb er /VADERSTAD  ( 2008 )  
ECLI:EP :BA:2 008 :T1174 0 5.20 0801 24;  and ,  T776 /0 7  (2 009 )  ECLI:EP :BA:2009 :T0 7760 7.2 0090 402 .  See 
a l so  EPGL Par t  G,  Ch ap .  VI ,  5 .  
2 2 7  T1 786 /09  (2010 )  ECLI :EP:BA:2010 :T178 609 .201 0 1123  and  T6 51/91 ,  sup ra  n .  225 .  
2 2 8  EPO an d  JPO,  sup ra  n .  20 8 ,  case  B-1  p .59 .  
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network and the production facili ty do not appear t o be included in the claimed 
subject-matter.  Although the EPO found the claim to depart  from the prior art  ‘on 
the basis of information received via a network from a production facil ity of the 
said object’ ,  novelty was not satisfied as the claim could cover other unclaimed 
devices,  other than the robot apparatus.  Helpfully,  the EPO explains that  should the 
network or production facili ty been part of the claimed subject -matter,  then the 
claim would have been directed to a robot and consequently , been held as novel 
given the absence of disclosure of such routing of information in the prior art.  The 
second claim is similar to the first ,  but i t  includes that  the ‘response information 
contains the attribute information and the unique identification information of  each 
of the said object  specified by the said server’.  Here,  the EPO found no difficulty 
in holding the subject -matter as novel given that ‘the response information is 
attribute information and a unique identification of the object’.  
2.  Japan 
In Japan, statutory law puts an emphasis on distributed publications or inventions 
made publicly available  online or through other electronic communications in Japan 
or elsewhere (art icle 29(1)(i ii)  JPA). 2 2 9  However,  this also includes  invention 
‘publicly worked’ 2 3 0  ( i .e. inventions performed in front of an audience somewhere 
in the world) and inventions ‘publicly known’ 2 3 1 ,  meaning that  the contents of an 
invention are known by the unspecified individuals who are not bound by an 
obligation of secrecy (e.g.  through the observation of a manufacturing process,  
during a lecture or presentation) .2 3 2  
Interestingly,  prior art  and the effect  of earlier patent applications are regulated 
separately in Japan. Article 29-2 JPA (in conjunction with article 39 ) covers the 
si tuation where two or more applications are in conflict.  Here,  art icle 29 -2 provides 
that  against  third parties,  information disclosed in earl ier patent applications not 
yet  published might  destroy novelty in the la t ter application. However,  if  the earlier 
patent application originates from the same inventor as the later  application and 
that  the information contained in the earl ier patent application is disclosed but not 
claimed, then the later application may be suc cessful  provided that the patentabil i ty 
requirements are satisfied. 2 3 3   
 
2 2 9  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 -3 ,  3 .1 .2 .  
2 3 0  Ar t i c l e  29 (1 )( i )  JPA.  
2 3 1  Ar t i c l e  29 (1 )( i i )  JPA.  
2 3 2  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 -3 ,  3 .1 .3 ,  3 .1 .4 .  
2 3 3  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 -3 .  
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Once the prior art  has been identified, the patent examiner proceeds to the 
examination of novelty. Taking into consideration the common general knowledge 
(including well -known art  in the specific field of the subject -matter , also known as 
‘enlarged novelty’) ,2 3 4  the patent examiner wearing the hat  of the person skilled in 
the art  will  look for differences between the closest  prior art  and the subject -matter 
of the patent application as a whole in front of him. Unsurprisingly, if differences 
exist,  then novelty subsists ,  whereas if  both are identical , then novelty is  deemed 
lacking.2 3 5  Similarly as  to what we have seen under the EPC, the novelty in specific  
features claimed is not destroyed by the prior disclosure of generic concepts. 2 3 6  
Conversely, if the prior art  includes specific features, then the more generic 
concepts will  be deemed known and cann ot be claimed as novel anymore. 2 3 7  
Going back to the example of the robot apparatus,  the JPO confirms that  their  
examination of novelty would lead to a similar outcome as reached by the EPO 
insofar as the first claim would lack novelty whilst the second cla im would be 
considered as novel. 2 3 8  Explaining i ts  decision regarding the first  claim, the JPO 
identifies the subject -matter as being a sub-combination between a robot apparatus 
and a server. 2 3 9  Many IoT-related technologies include sub -combination, as these 
inventions generally include multiple devices,  sensors and servers  that  all  
connected through a server  and for which it  is  generally difficult  to claim the system 
as a whole,2 4 0  emphasizing the importance of this example .  The JPO refused to f ind 
novelty in the claim because ‘on the basis of information received via a network 
from a production facil ity of the said object’ only depicts the source from which 
the server obtains information without specifying how this program performs a 
function of the robot apparatus.  We see here,  resurfacing the importance of 
disclosing the relationship between hardware and software.  On the other hand, the 
second claim satisfied novelty as i t  is much more detailed and depicts how the robot 
apparatus has a control sect ion storing a program –  which, itself , controls the 
functioning of the robot apparatus following the information received, departing 
from the disclosed prior art .  
 
2 3 4  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 -3 ,  3 .1 .2 .  
2 3 5  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 ;  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  3 .1 .  
2 3 6  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  3 .2 .  
2 3 7  Ib id .  
2 3 8  EPO an d  JPO,  sup ra  n .  20 8 ,  67-68 .  
2 3 9  JPGL Par t  I I I ,  2 -4 ,  4 .  
2 4 0  Th i s  i s  b ecau se ,  in c reas ing ly  p a r t  o f  t h i s  sy s t em ex i s t s  ou t s id e  Jap an ,  mak ing  i t  more  in t r i ca t e  t o  
ex erc i se  r i gh t s .  S .  Yama moto ,  'Enh an cemen t  o f  Cases  Re lat ed  to  Io T -Rela t ed  Tech nology ,  e t c . -Ou t l in e  
of  Cases  and  Co mmen ta ry  of  Re lev an t  Ex amin a t ion  S tan d ard s '  (2 017 )  285  To kugiko n ,  36 .  
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3.  US 
As for the two jurisdictions above, an invention must be ‘new’, meaning that it  must 
not have been disclosed more than a year before fi ling and i t must not have already 
been patented by somebody else. 2 4 1  Furthermore, a specific claim will  anticipate a 
more generic claim but the converse would  not hold true just  like in Japan and 
Europe.2 4 2  However,  unlike the other jurisdictions under scrutiny, there ha ve been 
certain changes in the recent years as to what should be included as part of the prior 
art.  If  previously,  disclosures through public us e or selling were l imited to the US 
terri tory,  the America Invents Act 2011 broadened this to the rest  of the world.  
But these are not the only noteworthy changes ,  this same legislation also changed 
the rules in relation to self -coll ision. Prior to the America Invents Act 2011, section 
102 (e) prescribed that a person shall be enti tled to a patent unless:  ‘the invention 
was described in —  (1) an application for pat ent,  published under section 122(b),  
by another  filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent 
or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another  fi led in the United 
States before the invention by the applicant for  patent,…’ (emphasis added). This 
means that  the US do not include prior patent applications by the same inventor but 
yet  to be published as part  of the prior art .  Currently,  the law sti ll  protects 
inventors ,  but the provisions have slightly changed. Section 102(a)(2) now reads as 
a person shall  be entit led to a patent unless:  ‘the claimed invention was described 
in a patent issued under section 151, or  in an application for patent published or 
deemed published under section 122(b),  in which the patent or application, as the 
case may be, names another inventor  and was effectively fi led before the effective 
fil ing date of the claimed invention.’ (emphasis added) .  
One of the particularit ies of the US system is that  unlike Europe and Jap an, the 
concept of secret  prior art will  be taken into consideration for both novelty and 
inventive step  where the applicants differ.  Where applicants are the same,  secret 
prior art  will  not be novelty destroying , but it  will  be taken into account if  the 
matter as a whole would be obvious to the person skil led in the art .  
The very nature of certain AI algorithms may render the satisfaction of the 
disclosure requirement challenging. Let’s focus on rule -based systems before 
turning to learned-based systems. Rule-based systems imply that  a researcher or a  
 
2 4 1  35  USC §102 .  Th e US  mo ved  f ro m a f i r s t - to - inv en t  to  a  f i r s t - to - f i l e  sy s t em in  2011 ,  a l ig n in g  th e  US  
wi th  th e  two o th er  ju r i sd i c t io n s  un d er  sc ru t iny .  Leahy -Smi th  Amer i ca  Inv en t s  Ac t ,  Pub .  L .  No .  112 -2 9  
(H.R.  12 4  1 25  (Sep t .  16 ,  2 011) ) .  
2 4 2  US Manu a l  o f  Pa t en t  Ex amin ing  P ro ced ure ,  sec t ion  213 1 .  
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team of researchers have pre -determined rules specific to a particular type of 
application. However, when it  comes to the patenting of this invention, they may 
want to draft  claims directed to a broader scope of the application developed that 
is  actually not supported by the rules,  thereby failing to meet the disclosure 
obligations. 2 4 3  These difficult ies are further exaggerated when contemplating the 
patentabili ty of learning models.  The performance of the AI program inherently 
depends on its network topology2 4 4  which combines training datasets, algorithms, 
number of layers, number and types of neurons,  the parameters etc.  Eventually,  the 
scope of the patent in the US will  be determined by what has been disclosed which 
teaches the person skilled in the art  for him to put into practice. But this begs the 
question as to how much should the applicant disclose to support broader claims 
based on the result ing application? There is  a risk in disclosing one way or just  a 
few ways of achieving the application. Whether in a rule -based or learning-based 
system, there is  a certain degree of randomness as well  a great  number of ways to 
achieve the application by changing the rules applied to the system or by changing 
the arrangements in the architecture of the system.  
Some have argued that  §112(f) 35 USC could be of use as it  al lows functional 
claiming.2 4 5  This could be very interesting as we menti oned that AI inventors are 
interested in patenting specific functions l ike ‘means to determine presence of 
objects in an environment’. As confirmed by case law, the Federal  Circuit held that  
an inventor does not have to disclose the entire structure for pe rforming the 
functions claimed. 2 4 6  However, this provision has i ts  limitations in relation to  
computer-related inventions as i t  might not prevent the inventor from having to 
detail the specifics of a network. In EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v AT&T Mobili ty 
LLC ,2 4 7  the Court  of Appeal of the Federal  Circuit  held that  unless the functional 
claiming refers to the most basic functions of a computer (e.g. storing , processing 
 
2 4 3  §11 2(a )  35  USC req ui r in g :  ‘ a  wr i t t en  d esc r ip t io n  o f  th e  inv en t ion ,  and  o f  th e  mann er  and  p ro cess  o f  
mak ing  and  us in g  i t ,  in  su ch  fu l l ,  c l ea r ,  con ci se ,  an d  ex act  t e rms  as  to  en able  an y  p er son  sk i l l ed  in  t h e  
a r t  to  which  i t  p e r t a in s ,  o r  wi th  wh ich  i t  i s  mo s t  n ear ly  conn ec ted ,  to  mak e  and  u se  th e  same,  and  sh a l l  
s e t  fo r th  th e  b es t  mod e con temp lat ed  by  th e  inv en to r  o r  j o in t  in v entor  o f  ca r ry in g  o u t  th e  
inv en t ion . ’ ( emp h asi s  add ed) .  For  o th e r  ju r i sd i c t ion s  see  sup ra  n .  1 8 .  
2 4 4  Fo r  ex amples ,  see  h t tp s : / / t oward sd atasc i en ce . co m/th e -mo st ly -co mp le t e-ch ar t -o f -n eu ra l -n etwo rk s -
ex pla in ed -3 fb 6f2367 464   
2 4 5  DeCo s ta  and  Car rano ,  su pra  n .  10 1 .  
2 4 6  In  re  Kat z  In t era c t i ve  Cal l  Pro cess ing  Pa ten t  L i t iga t ion  (201 1)  639  F .3 d  1303 ,  131 6  (Fed .  C i r . )  
(Katz ) .  Th i s  d ec i s io n  en abled  inv en to r s  to  avo id  d i sclo s ing  th e  mo st  b as i c  fun ct ion s  o f  a  co mpu ter  in  
ev ery  p a t en t  ap pl i ca t io n .  
2 4 7  No .  14 -13 92  (Fed .  Ci r .  2 015)  ( Eon ) .  
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data) then the inventor must disclose the information, this includes the disclosure 
of algorithms necessary to implement the fu nction.2 4 8  In casu ,  the proceedings dealt  
with the failure to disclose a t  least  one algorithm for providing structure for various 
computer-implemented means-plus-function form claims.  Therefore,  unless the 
functions are common to all  general-purpose computers (l ike receiving, processing 
or storing information), 2 4 9  patent applicants are required to disclose the underlying 
structure of a specific function .2 5 0  
4.  Comparison 
As the l ist  of protectable subject -matters grows, there is a  greater emphasis on 
patentabili ty requirements such as novelty and inventive step to ensure the 
legitimacy of the patent system. Whilst the novelty requirement has not created 
much trouble by the past ,  some remaining disparities could lead to greater si tuations 
in which an invent ion receives protection in one jurisdiction and not another.  
Difficult ies certainly exist  in identifying the relevant prior art ,  understanding i t  
and updating i t  in relation to AI and IoT inventions. 2 5 1  Furthermore, concerns 
increase in relation to the satisfaction of the  sufficiency disclosure requirement 
given the difficulties in describing how AI algorithms works.  
The existing differences in the assessment of the novelty requirement provide 
evidence of deeply-rooted and conflicting policy objectives. The most noticeable 
difference refers to how different jurisdictions determine the prior art  for the 
purpose of conflicting patent applications.  Given that  patent applications are not 
published on the same day as they are fi led,  but up to eighteen months later,  there 
is  a window within which several  patent applications covering the same subject -
matter might be filed,  and in which case,  there is  a risk of double patenting or 
patent thickets (if  the subject -matter is similar but not identical ).  So, to what degree 
can the earlier patent application yet  to be published be novelty destroying ? This 
 
2 4 8  Th ereb y  r ev er t ing  b ack  to  i t s  fo rmer  case  l aw.  See WM S Ga ming ,  In c .  v .  In t ’ l  Ga me Tech .  (199 9)  18 4  
F .3d  1339 ,  13 48 –4 9  (Fed .  Ci r . ) .  Al so  c i t ed  in  Eon  a t  7 .  Ka tz  t h ereby  r ep resen t s  an  ex cep t ion  to  a  wel l -
es t ab l i sh ed  b ody  o f  cases  r equ i r in g  d i sc lo su re .  
2 4 9  And  ev en  h ere ,  th e  cou r t  warn ed  th at  fo r  a  n a r ro wer  con st ru c t ion  o f  th e  p l a in  meaning  of  t h es e  
fun c t ion s ,  app l i can t s  a re  r eq ui red  to  mak e  d i sclo su re  o f  th e  s t ru c tu re .  Eo n,  su pra  n .  24 6 ,  a t  11 .  
2 5 0  As  p rev iou s ly  h eld  in  Ergo L icen s ing  LLC v Ca re fus ion  303  In c.  (201 2)  673  F .3d  1361  (Fed .  Ci r . ) ,  
1365 .  Ho ld ing  o th erwi se  wou ld  r end er  th e  c l a im in def in i t e  in  n a tu re .   
2 5 1  A  b as i c  i l lu s t r a t i on  o f  th i s  r e l a t es  to  ho w th e  in v en t ion  i s  d e f in ed  as  b e ing  n ew in  an  AI  wo r ld  as  we l l  
a s  p rev iou s  inv en t ion s  in  t he  f i e ld .  As  expla i n ed  in  sec t ion  2 ,  AI  p rog rams  mig ht  in vo lv e  s imi l a r  d ec i s ion -
mak ing  in  d i f f e ren t  t echn ical  app l i cat ion s .  Here ,  t he  a lgo r i th ms  o r  t r a in ing  d a t aset s  may  b e  s imi l ar ,  
wh ich  crea t es  an  ov er l ap  be tween  th e  p ro cess  and  the  r esu l t s  and  th e re fo re ,  may  b e  nov e l ty -d e feat ing .  
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section attempted to provide an answer to this question by differentiating between 
when the applicant of the earlier patent application was a third party and the 
si tuation in which both applicants are identical  or partially the same (self -
coll ision).    
The way Japan and the US do not treat  self -collision issues with caution 
demonstrates that  this patent system encourages  the proliferation of patents over 
similar inventions with minor variants.  Whilst  this drawback may be mitigated by 
the fact that  Japanese patent examiners are able to replace obvious variants when 
determining novelty (the claimed invention therefore does not have to be explicit ly 
disclosed in the prior art ,  implicit disclosure suffices)  or that  this has an impact on 
the assessment of inventive step l ike in the US , this can be contrasted with the 
Europe where the patent culture deters patent applicants from applying for 
protection for smaller contribution s,  thereby preferring to reward the first  
inventor.2 5 2  This may provide a further explanation why the Japanese patent system 
is more IoT and AI innovation friendly. In a technical field characterized by the 
multiplici ty of inventors involved in the inventive process,  there is  a certain 
convenience in allowing multiple inventions claimed in relation to a similar 
subject-matter by the same inventors given th at  large teams of inventors may be 
working together and consequently,  there is a greater chance that  patent 
applications are being submitted in short  period of time.  
The issue of conflicting patent applications is not new. 2 5 3  Already in 1988, the 
AIPPI adopted a resolution for the exclusion of self -collision in si tuations where 
the applicants in both applications are partially the same. 2 5 4  Nevertheless,  some 
thirty years later,  divergences remain that lead to a si tuation in which some patents 
may be granted in some jurisdictions (e.g.  Japan or US) and not others (e.g.  
Europe).  At the AIPPI Congress 2018, 2 5 5  one of the study questions tackled the 
issue of conflict ing patent applications.  It  is  noticeable that  the majority of the 
respondents were in favor of harmonization in this area. 2 5 6  There was an 
 
2 5 2  Th ere  a re  d i f f e ren ces  in  t e rms  o f  t h e  form among s t  d i f f e ren t  cou nt r i es .  WIPO In t e rn at ion a l  Bu reau ,  
sup ra  n .  24 ,  9 .  
2 5 3  Ib id .  
2 5 4  Reso lu t ion  Q8 9C.  Th i s  was  fo l lo wed b y  2  o th er  r eso lu t ion s  (Reso lu t ion  Q126  in  1995  and  Reso lu t i o n  
Q16 7 in  20 02 ) .  Th e top ic  was  on ce  ag a in  a t  th e  cen te r  o f  a  s tudy  qu es t ion  for  th e  AIPPI  cong ress  201 8 ,  
demon st ra t ing  i t s  top i cal i t y .   
2 5 5  S .  Math eso n ,  J .  Osh a ,  A -M.  Verschuu r ,  Y.  Inu i ,  A.  Laakon en  and  R .  Nack ,  20 18 S tud y  Qu es t io n :  
co nf l i c t ing  pa ten t  app l i ca t ion s  (2018 )  av a i l ab l e  a t  h t tp s : / / a ip p i .o rg /wp -
co nten t /up lo ad s /20 18/01 /Con f l i c t i ng -p a t en t - ap pl i ca t io n s -Study -Gu id e l in es -2 9 Jan2 018 .pd f .   
2 5 6  85%  o f  th e  44  r es pond ent s .  
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overwhelming support for ensuring that secret  prior art  is  novelty -destroying where 
the applicants are different. 2 5 7  Regarding secret  prior art  against  the same inventor, 
a majority believed that  i t  should equally be used for the purpose of novelty without 
any anti -self-collision t ime period. 2 5 8   
Although the issue of conflicting patent applications relates to the breadt h of the 
prior art  playing an essential  part  of the patent system , there are also differences 
in terms of how novelty is  assessed in the three jurisdictions.  First ly,  there are 
differences in what should be compared against  the prior art . Here, i t  is  notew orthy 
that  Europe and Japan apply a whole -contents approach whilst  the US measures 
each claim-based approach.2 5 9  Secondly, despite novelty being a strict  requirement,  
Japan applies a concept of enlarged novelty by which the threshold is heightened 
for patent applications as novelty will  be determined not based on what has 
traditionally been referred to as ‘photographic novelty’ (i.e.  are there any 
differences between the invention in the patent application as compared with the 
prior art) but based on everything that  the person skil led in the art  understands as 
being included when reading the prior ar t.  Even stricter,  the person skilled in the 
art  will  deny novelty where there is  a difference between the prior art  and the whole 
contents of the patent application that only amounts to a well -known equivalent.  
This can have important consequences in relation to generic/sp ecific patent 
applications.  If ,  as in the US or Europe, the patentabil i ty of a generic does not 
preclude the patentabili ty of a more specific subject -matter,  patent applicants will 
have to demonstrate that  the specific is  not simply a substi tute or equival ent in 
Japan. In other words,  the patent applicant must demonstrate that  the specific later  
invention would not be derived within the prior ‘enlarged’ disclosure part  of the 
prior art.  
Aside from the concern as to whether the person skil led in the art shou ld be re-
defined for the purpose of AI-inventions, 2 6 0  the extent to which inventors must 
disclose their inventions is  st il l  unclear.  Patent law requires clarity and sufficiency 
of claims to teach the person skil led in the art  and demonstrate that  the invent ion 
is repeatable. The main problem with AI programs is that these are usually opaque 
 
2 5 7  95%  o f  th e  44  r espond ent s .  
2 5 8  75%  o f  th e  44  r espond ent s .  
2 5 9  Th e c l a im-b ased  ap pro ach  i s  l ik e ly  to  c reat e  co mp lex i t i e s  in  th e  fu tu re  g iv en  the  in t r i cac i es  o f  AI  an d  
Io T t echno lo gy .  Cla ims in heren t ly  inv olv e  n ew el emen t s  wh ich  in t e rming le  wi th  th e  a l r ead y  k no wn and  
pa t en t  ex amin er s  wi l l  f ind  i t  mo re d i f f i cu l t  t o  d ra f t  c l a ims  in  a  way  which  fo cuses  on  th e  n ew e l emen t s  
on ly .  
2 6 0  To pic  which  h as  a t t r ac t ed  a t t r ac t ion  in  th e  l a s t  yea r s  and  wh ich  i s  p redo min ant ly  r e l ev an t  fo r  
inv en t iv e  s t ep  bu t  no t  wi thout  imp act s  fo r  th e  as sessmen t  o f  no v el ty .   
57 
 
with relatively l it tle information as to how a particular system reaches a specific 
decision or result . Whilst decisions l ike EON  in the US lead to the requirement of 
the algorithm’s disclosure,  what is  the state of play in relation to network topology? 
Some industry players seem to believe that there is no need to provide detail  as to 
the network structure. 2 6 1   Legal experts in Europe advocate however the need define 
the features of the neural  network in great  depth but perhaps the source codes do 
not have to be disclosed to meet the enablement requirement. 2 6 2  
This has consequences not only for the grant ing of patents (creating difficult ies for 
patent examiners to assess novelty) ,  but will  be crucial  in post -grant procedures.  
Indeed, if i t  is not possible to understand how an AI program reaches a specific 
result,  i t  will be diff icult for the plaintiff to assert t hat  an infringement using the 
same method occurred. There is a risk that in the absence of mature ways of 
categorizing exist ing knowledge essential  to identify the prior art,  more dependence 
will be set  on the inventor’s disclosures of prior art . Yet, it  must be noted that  the 
inventor has only the obligation to disclose the prior art  that  he is aware of  in a 
field where machines are increasingly replacing human ingenuity  is  l ikely to 
decline and therefore, potentially has drastic consequences for the prope r 
identification of prior art.  
VII. Conclusion and recommendations  
The is no denying that  the information society  characterizing the 4 t h  Industrial  
Revolution has serious implications for the innovative process .  Current innovation 
relates to how information is handled and process ed to which algorithms are key as 
they treat  huge amounts of data in a matter of minutes where i t  would take months , 
if not years , for humans to carry out the same tasks.  If  some argue that the patent 
system does not need to be overhauled to handle AI inventions, 2 6 3  there remain 
serious concerns that  the patent paradigm may not be able to adapt given i ts  current 
emphasis on the replacement of manual labor by machines  when i t is  actually 
moving onto the replacement of the intellectual activity i tself . A re-evaluation of 
the justifications for the existence of a patent system as well  as the appropriate 
balance to be struck between the interests of right -holders and society is  necessary.  
 
2 6 1  Sp in e l l a -Mamo ( IP  co un se l  a t  se l f -dr iv ing  car  s t a r tup  ZOOX) sp eaking  a t  an  ar t i f i c i a l  p an el  i n  
Septemb er  2 018  at  t h e  AIPPI  Con gress .    
2 6 2  Jon es  Day ,  Pa ten t in g  Art i f i c ia l  In t e l l ig en ce  a nd  Ma ch in e  Lea rn ing  Inno vat ion s  in  Eu ro p e  (Oc t ,  2 018 ) .  
2 6 3  See  sp eech  h eld  b y  Hel i  P ih l a j amaa (EPO Di rector  Pa t en t  Law)  a t  an  a r t i f i c i a l  p an e l  in  Sep temb e r  
2018  at  th e  AIPPI  Cong ress .    
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Despite the subject-matter exclusions implying that  algorithms and neural networks 
are not el igible for protection ; this research project  demonstrate s that  al l  three 
jurisdictions found ways to render some types of algorithms and neural  n etworks 
eligible.  In fact ,  al l  three are very active in the international forum to f ind ways to 
better seize the opportunities bestowed by AI and IoT -related technologies by 
incorporating AI innovation in computer -implemented inventions and ensuring that 
they remain competitive.  Yet, stretching computer -generating inventions to 
encapsulate the intangible nature of the future of innovation could bring patent law 
to breaking point , policy-makers to think about the ways in which i t can respond to 
the needs of technological  developments where machines are replacing human 
ingenuity.  Furthermore, the extent to which patent protection is available remains 
different in the jurisdictions studied  whilst  the international and cross-border 
nature of innovation in AI and IoT fields begs for further harmonization in the 
domain.   
One of the questions resurfacing today relates to the eligibil ity of algorithms for 
patent protection  and one of the most common arguments is  that  these  are open 
source and protected by copyright so they do not need further protection. If AI and 
IoT-related technologies have so far attracted the interest  of al l size companies 
because many of the most common algorithms are available as open -source 
(developed from OSS), small - and mid-scale companies remain at  a disadvantage 
compared to large-scale companies who are better posit ioned to invest 
simultaneously in other activities that are susceptible of patentabil ity. 2 6 4  
Additionally,  these smaller companies are in a more vulnerable posit ion in order to 
secure and retain investment from third parties,  resulting from the doubts 
surrounding patentabili ty or the apprehension of invalidity through post -grant 
procedures.   
Despite the availabil ity of patent eli gibili ty,  i t  is  hard to conceive how the trend of 
having open source algorithms would change. To the contrary, OSS is extremely 
popular and will continue to grow. These algorithms are part of the prior art and 
should not come under private control.  Allowin g the eligibil ity of  complex 
algorithms should contribute to this as patent applicants will be compelled to 
clearly establish the parts already known or available from the parts for which they 
intend to get patent rights.  This should also contribute to reducing the risks of 
patent thickets as not every l i tt le improvement of the technology will  be pa tentable , 
as well  as providing adequate incentives to address key technological  challenges of 
 
2 6 4  E .g .  Go og le  mak ing  i t s  a lgor i th ms  op en - so urce  whi l s t  s imu l t an eou s ly  inv est ing  in  ac t iv i t i e s  su ch  a s  
ba t ch  no rmal i za t ion  ( essen t i a l  fo r  improving  th e  speed ,  p e rforman ce,  and  s t ab i l i ty  o f  ar t i f i c i a l  n eu ra l  
ne two rk s )  to  ob tain  p a t en t  r igh t s  ov er  th ese  in v en t io ns .   
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machine learning. Whilst  there is  a genuine enthusiasm in enabling the patentabili ty 
of AI-related inventions within the current patent system, there is  a growing  need 
to determine the appropriate scope of protection for these inventions.  For example,  
considering a neural  network as a product may result  in too l it tle protection , whilst  
considering it  as a process may lead to too broad protection  resulting in the increase 
of market prices for consumers above efficient levels  and rise of patent thickets .  
Against  the current backdrop, patent offices  bear an important role in advising 
inventors on what is  el igible for patentabili ty and how to draft successful claims  
(especially in l ight of the paucity of cases) . But equally, patent offices must develop 
strategies to cope with the growing number of applications relating to AI and IoT 
technologies  which has an impact on the quali ty of patentabil ity assessment,  
identification of prior art and evaluation of the appropriate breadth of the monopoly 
granted through patents.  
Without a reliable and robust way to categorize and describe inventions, it  is  hard 
to identify the appropriate prior art .  One of the current difficult ies relates to the 
current practice whereby patent attorneys have developed skil lful  draftsmanship 
techniques to avoid unpatentabil ity. 2 6 5  Many patents involving algorithms or AI 
programs avoid the reliance of concepts such as ‘algorithms’  and ‘programs’  or ‘AI 
programs’ altogether. 2 6 6  In the absence of standardization of appropriate search 
procedures and methods of classification of the prior art , patent examiners and 
inventors are left to their own devices with l it t le incentive to scrutini ze the prior 
art in a meaningful way. Furthermore, patent offices during the examination process 
are more reliant on the prior art  as identified by the applicant,  which might reduce 
over t ime and eventually render the novelty requirement meaningless.   
Although the three jurisdictions under scrutiny apply the novelty requirement,  
divergences remain in i ts application. There is  a strong possibil ity that  these 
differences provide advantages to in ventors in some jurisdictions where the system 
is more inventor-friendly (i .e.  Japan  and US). Nevertheless,  frustration can be felt 
by inventors securing protection in these countries while being unable to obtain 
protection in other jurisdictions (l ike Eur ope) over the same subject -matters.   
 
2 6 5  H .  Kohn o,  'T ip s  fo r  id en t i fy ing  AI/ Io T in v ent io ns  an d  acqui r ing  p a t en t s  fo r  th em'  (201 8)  Resea rch  
In s t i tu t e  o f  Eco no my,  Tra de  an d  Ind us t ry ,  6 7 .  
2 6 6  As con f i rmed b y  two p at en t  a t to rn ey s  in  To kyo .  See a l so ,  O .  Baldu s ,  ‘A  P rac t i ca l  Gu id e  on  Ho w to  
Paten t  Ar t i f i c i a l  In t e l l ig ence In v ent io n s  and  Co mpu ter  P rog rams wi th in  th e  German an d  Europ ean  Paten t  
Sy stem:  Mu ch  Ado  abo ut  Li t t l e ’  (20 19 )  4 1(12 )  EIPR ,  753 .  
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Held as public-serving, patent law should serve the public interest by ensuring that  
information and knowledge are disseminated in society.  The current practices 
enable the patentabili ty of AI without upholding the disclosure requirement. For 
example,  in Europe or Japan, there is  no need to disclose the algorithm s relied upon 
or the actual  role of the AI in the invent ive process.  In the US, even if algorithms 
should be disclosed, there is a current understanding that network topology are not 
subject  to the same disclosure requirement .  It  is  therefore time to address this issue. 
The EPO has already paved the way and has  welcomed views on how sufficiency of 
disclosure should be assessed in relation to AI inventions.  In order to avoid black 
box patenting, there is a need for the three jurisdictions to establish whether  
sufficient disclosure is  satisfied on the abil ity for a computer to reproduce the 
claimed results.   
Recommendations :  
1  –  Limit the ineligibil ity of algorithms from patentability :  there is a need to 
ensure that  the patent system adapts to new technologies and especially,  the 
evolution of the nature of the  innovative process and guarantees that  the patent 
justifications and rationale are met. It  is therefore t ime to recognize that algorithms 
today are much more than mathematical  formulas.  These result  from human 
ingenuity and provide complex solutions to tec hnical  problems. 2 6 7  If  a change in 
legislation can be difficult  to achieve in practice,  a better way would be a change 
in interpretation of  this excluded subject -matter .  Only Europe has a statutory 
exclusion for mathematical formula. It  could be envisaged t hat this exclusion l imits 
itself to simple algorithmic problems which can be achieved easily by the human 
mind .  Once there is  an invention in a field of technology then this one should be 
patentable regardless of any further requirements linked to technica lity. This would 
also contribute to having a patent system that  is more easily accessible in the eyes 
of inventors which ult imately would lead to easier claims to assess.  
2  –  Countries should harmonize their approach to novelty:  jurisdictions should 
reflect on whether a whole -contents approach or a claims-based approach is 
desirable in light of the current innovation trends. Here,  a whole-contents 
approach should be preferred .  Furthermore,  self-collision should apply to both 
 
2 6 7  A  d i scu ss ion  wel l  un d erway  in  t h e  US wh ere  fou r  o p t ion s  h av e  b een  ou t l in ed  fo l lo wing  th e  con fu s io n  
o f  th e  Al i ce/M a yo  t e s t .  Th ese  a re:  1 )  No  ch ang es  and  l e t  th e  co ur t s  r e f in e  th e  t e s t  on  a  case -by -case  b as i s ;  
2 )  In t ro du c ing  a  s t a tu to ry  l i s t  o f  ex clu sio n s  l ik e  in  th e  EPC;  3 )  Ado pt  a  lo wer  e l ig ib i l i t y  s t an d ard  su ch  
as  t h at  th e  in v en t io n  mu s t  r esu l t  f ro m hu m an in g en ui ty ,  h av e  a  r ea l  l i f e  ex i s t en ce  o r  cont r ibu te  t o  
t echno lo gica l  ar t s ;  f in al ly ,  4 )  Remov e  su bjec t -mat t e r  ex clu sion s  a l tog e th er  and  fo cus  on  p at en tab i l i ty  
r equ i remen t s .  See  Cong ress ion a l  Research  Serv i ces ,  sup ra  n .  30 ,  2 6 -3 0 .  
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secret prior art originating from the applicant and third parties  to ensure that  
only valuable subject-matters are patented and avoid double -patenting issues.  
4  –  Both Europe and the US should drop the technical character  doctrine:  in both 
jurisdictions,  this doctrine has led to a series of complexit ies  and uncertainties .  Not 
only is there evidence that this doctrine is hard for courts to apply in particular  
cases,  but i t  can lead to bizarre and often hard to justify outcomes. Here,  focusing 
on the inventive concept as done in Japan contributes to the legitimacy of the pa tent 
system in the future.   
5  –  Further discussions on the rationale of the disclosure requirement  should take 
place.  Whilst  the idea behind the sufficiency of disclosure is  to enable the person 
skil led in the art  to learn how to replicate the invention as  described in the patent  
application, there is no denying that  as a source of knowledge, patent applications 
are rarely relied upon. Therefore,  the social  goal of contributing to the 
dissemination of knowledge and information is not realized. Perhaps the 
jurisdictions under scrutiny should consider moving away from a system where 
applicants  are merely required to provide information how to make and use the 
invention to focus on ensuring that  information related to the reasons as to why or 
how the invention works are specified.2 6 8  Equally, there is  a need to ensure that  
the rules and processes included in a system are explained.  
6  –  Patent Offices must carry on their work on the dissemination of case studies 
in the area of AI and IoT-related technologies :  there is  no denying that  these are 
extremely useful for prospective applicants,  patent examiners and add transparency 
in the application process. As such, patent offices should carry on monitor ing the 
evolution of intangible innovation and should provide addit ional examples as to the 
patentabili ty of algorithms, neural  networks,  training processes,  parameters, etc.  
Here,  i t  would be particularly helpful to kn ow how much should be disclosed to  
meet the novelty threshold  e.g. should the topology of the network be disclosed? 
Should the algorithms be provided? Or the parameters used? This require s careful 
examination as this could have dramatic consequences on the patentabil ity of future 
inventions.  
The patent system has survived three industrial  revolutions without changing 
drastically and has the abil ity to survive a fourth, but there are sti ll  elements that  
can be improved. Whilst  the current position amongst patent offices  seems to be to 
approach the patentabil ity of AI inventions on a case -by-case basis,  current 
 
2 6 8  As a l r eady  sugg es t ed  b y  S .  B.  Sey more ,  'Pat en t ing  th e  Un expla in ed '  (201 9)  96(4 )  Wa sh ULO ,  70 7 -
752 .  
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divergences in regime are likely to be of more central  importance in the future. The 
current situation leads to the downplaying of the AI element in pa tent applications 
thereby minimizing the actual  disclosure.  This does not seem in l ine with the goals 
of patent law.  Although the recommendations above might sound radical ,  eventually 
these changes are required to guarantee the societal  benefits  deriving from AI and 
IoT technologies.  Without this,  patent at torneys,  patent examiners and eventually  
courts will  be asked to  make decisions on a case-by-case basis without  fully taking 
into consideration the broader policy implications of these decisions.  
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